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The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Form SC 13D/A - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

SCHEDULE 13D/A

INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN STATEMENTS FILED PURSUANT

TO § 240.13d-1(a) AND AMENDMENTS THERETO FILED PURSUANT TO

§ 240.13d-2(a)

Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Amendment No. 2)*

Mallinckrodt plc

(Name of Issuer)

Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share

(Title of Class of Securities)

G5785G107

(CUSIP Number)

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.

1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3

New York, N.Y. 10036-2600

Tel.: +1 (212) 561-5540

(Name, Address and Telephone Number of Person Authorized to Receive Notices and Communications)

August 2, 2021

(Date of Event which Requires Filing of this Statement)

If the filing person has previously filed a statement on Schedule 13G to report the acquisition that is the subject of this Schedule 13D, and is filing this schedule because of §§ 240.13d-1(e), 240.13d-1(f) or 240.13d-1(g), check the following box [ ].

Note: Schedules filed in paper format shall include a signed original and five copies of the schedule, including all exhibits. See § 240.13d-7(b) for other parties to whom copies are to be sent.

*The remainder of this cover page shall be filled out for a reporting person's initial filing on this form with respect to the subject class of securities, and for any subsequent amendment containing information which would alter disclosures provided in a prior cover page.

The information required on the remainder of this cover page shall not be deemed to be "filed" for the purpose of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act") or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that section of the Act but shall be subject to all other provisions of the Act (however, see the Notes).

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 2 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Buxton Helmsley Holdings, Inc.
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	WC
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Michigan
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			0
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			1,315,234
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			1,315,234
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	1,315,234
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	1.6%¹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 3 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	WC
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Michigan
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			0
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			1,315,234
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			1,315,234
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	1,315,234
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	1.6%²
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

² Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 4 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Alexander Parker
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	AF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	USA
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			0
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			1,315,234
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			1,315,234
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	1,315,234
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	1.6%³
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 5 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Vladislav Dikii
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			220,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			220,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	220,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.3%⁴
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

⁴ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 6 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Vladimir Kovalenko
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			370,183
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			370,183
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	370,183
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.4%⁵
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

⁵ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 7 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			255,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			255,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	255,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.3%⁶
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

⁶ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 9 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Elena Tsygankova
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	WC
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			0
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			228,000
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			228,000
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	228,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.3%⁸
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

⁸ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 10 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Thomas Gitter
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Wisconsin
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			0
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			235,250
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			235,250
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	235,250
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.3%⁹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

⁹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 11 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			193,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			193,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	193,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.2%¹⁰
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁰ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 12 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Roman Dontsov Valentinovich
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			135,212
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			135,212
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	135,212
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.2%¹¹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹¹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 14 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Alexey Isaev
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			121,347
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			121,347
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	121,347
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹³
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹³ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 15 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Alexander Koch
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Germany
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			120,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			120,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	120,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁴
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁴ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 16 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	James Jonathan Josey
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Missouri
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			111,400
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			111,400
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	111,400
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁵
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁵ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 17 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Florida
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			101,900
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			101,900
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	101,900
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁶
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁶ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 18 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Edgard Gafurov
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			96,512
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			96,512
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	96,512
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁷
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁷ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 19 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Kimberly Tully
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	New Jersey
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			95,060
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			95,060
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	95,060
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁸
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁸ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 20 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Joan I. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	WC
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Missouri
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			93,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			93,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	93,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%¹⁹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

¹⁹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 21 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	James Paul Carey
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Ohio
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			90,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			90,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	90,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁰
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁰ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 22 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Janice J. O'Connor
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Missouri
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			84,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			84,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	84,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²¹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²¹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 23 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Andrew Gruber
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Massachussets
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			60,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			60,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	60,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²²
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²² Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 24 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Yushenkova Olga Petrovna
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			77,699
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			77,699
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	77,699
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²³
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²³ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 25 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Vanik Petrosian
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			74,300
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			74,300
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	74,300
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁴
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁴ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 26 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Richard Barry
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Texas
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			72,285
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			72,285
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	72,285
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁵
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁵ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 27 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			67,413
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			67,413
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	67,413
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁶
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁶ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 28 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Chris Tichenor
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Kentucky
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			54,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			54,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	54,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁷
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁷ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 29 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Victor Pardo
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	New York
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			52,080
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			52,080
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	52,080
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁸
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁸ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 30 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Alex Peter Wounlund
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Denmark
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			47,018
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			47,018
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	47,018
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%²⁹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

²⁹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 31 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Petr Hoferek
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Nebraska
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			45,100
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			45,100
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	45,100
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%³⁰
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³⁰ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 32 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	John V. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	WC
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Missouri
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			44,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			44,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	44,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.1%³¹
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³¹ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 33 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			40,000
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			40,000
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	40,000
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.0%³²
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³² Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 34 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Mary Dunne
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	New York
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			39,347
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			39,347
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	39,347
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.0%³³
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³³ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 36 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Lisrael Larrondo
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Spain
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			23,634
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			23,634
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	23,634
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.0%³⁵
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³⁵ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 37 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	David Lamb
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Oregon
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			17,632
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			17,632
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	17,632
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.0%³⁶
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³⁶ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

CUSIP No. G5785G107

SCHEDULE 13D

Page 38 of 35 Pages

1	NAMES OF REPORTING PERSONS I.R.S. IDENTIFICATION NOS. OF ABOVE PERSONS (ENTITIES ONLY)
	Valerii Mansurov
2	CHECK THE APPROPRIATE BOX IF A MEMBER OF A GROUP*
	(a) [X] (b) [ ]
3	SEC USE ONLY

4	SOURCE OF FUNDS (See Instructions)
	PF
5	CHECK IF DISCLOSURE OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO ITEMS 2(D) OR 2(E)
	[ ]
6	CITIZENSHIP OR PLACE OF ORGANIZATION
	Russia
NUMBER OF SHARES BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON WITH		7	SOLE VOTING POWER
			180,375
		8	SHARED VOTING POWER
			0
		9	SOLE DISPOSITIVE POWER
			180,375
		10	SHARED DISPOSITIVE POWER
			0
11	AGGREGATE AMOUNT BENEFICIALLY OWNED BY EACH REPORTING PERSON
	180,375
12	CHECK BOX IF THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT IN ROW (11) EXCLUDES CERTAIN SHARES (See Instructions)
	[ ]
13	PERCENT OF CLASS REPRESENTED BY AMOUNT IN ROW (11)
	0.2%³⁷
14	TYPE OF REPORTING PERSON (See Instructions)
	HC, CO

__________________

³⁷ Based upon 84,627,154 shares of Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share ("Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc. (the "Issuer") outstanding as of March 26, 2021, as reported in the Issuer's quarterly report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 4, 2021.

This Amendment No. 2 to Schedule 13D ("Amendment No. 2") amends and supplements the Schedule 13D originally filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by the Reporting Persons on March 5, 2021 (the "Schedule 13D") relating to the Ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share (the "Shares"), of Mallinckrodt plc (the "Issuer"). Except as specifically provided herein, this Amendment No. 2 does not modify any of the information previously reported on the Schedule 13D. Capitalized terms used but not otherwise defined in this Amendment No. 2 shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Schedule 13D.

Item 1.

Security and Issuer

Item 1 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

This Schedule 13D is being filed with respect to common shares issued by Mallinckrodt plc, whose principal executive offices are at College Business & Technology Park, Cruiserath, Blanchardstown, Dublin 15, Ireland.

Item 2.

Identity and Background

Item 2 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

(a)

This Schedule 13D is being filed jointly pursuant to that certain Joint Filing Agreement filed herewith as Exhibit 99.1 by:

• Buxton Helmsley Holdings, Inc. ("Holdings")

• The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. ("Buxton")

• Alexander Parker ("Parker") and

• The individual persons and entities listed below (collectively, the "Individual Members"):

o Vladislav Dikii

o Vladimir Kovalenko

o Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich

o Elena Tsygankova

o Thomas Gitter

o Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich

o Roman Dontsov Valentinovich

o Alexey Isaev

o Alexander Koch

o James Jonathan Josey

o Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi

o Edgard Gafurov

o Kimberly Tully

o Joan I. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)

o James Paul Carey

o Janice J. O'Connor

o Andrew Gruber

o Yushenkova Olga Petrovna

o Vanik Petrosian

o Richard Barry

o Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich

o Chris Tichenor

o Victor Pardo

o Alex Peter Wounlund

o Petr Hoferek

o John V. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)

o Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich

o Mary Dunne

o Lisrael Larrondo

o David Lamb

o Valerii Mansurov

		Together with Holdings, Buxton, and Parker, the Individual Members comprise a group within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) of the Act.

	(b)	The business address of Holdings, Buxton, and Parker is 1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3, New York, N.Y. 10036-2600. Information regarding the Individual Members is set forth on Schedule A.

	(c)	Buxton is the wholly-owned subsidiary of Holdings, a parent holding company. Buxton is a private asset management and financial services firm and a registered investment advisor. Buxton holds the Shares reported in this Schedule 13D in the accounts of Buxton's discretionary clients. Parker is the sole control person of both Buxton and Holdings. Parker holds the title of Director at Holdings and Senior Managing Director at Buxton. There are no other directors, officers, or control persons at Holdings or Buxton. Information regarding the Individual Members is set forth on Schedule A.


	(d)	During the last five years, neither Holdings, Buxton, Parker, nor any of the Individual Members have been convicted in a criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations or similar misdemeanors).

	(e)	During the last five years, neither Holdings, nor the Individual Members, have been a party to a civil proceeding of a judicial or administrative body of competent jurisdiction and became subject to a judgment, decree or final order enjoining future violations of, or prohibiting or mandating activities subject to, federal or state securities laws or finding any violation with respect to such laws. Buxton and Parker were involved in an adversary proceeding filed against them by the Issuer (Mallinckrodt Plc. v. The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. and Alexander E. Parker, Adv Proc. No. 21-505242), as part of the Issuer's Chapter 11 proceedings (Mallinckrodt plc, et al., Case No. 20-12522), for which an injunction (the "Injunction") was issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "Court"), enjoining certain activities of Buxton, Parker, and any other shareholders/members deemed by the Issuer to be "acting in concert" with Buxton and Parker (Injunction, § 6). Those enjoined activities include, for example, the calling of an extraordinary general meeting of the Issuer's shareholders/members, nomination of directors or officers as part of any general meeting of the shareholders/members, casting votes in any general meeting of the shareholders/members to "remove" or "replace" directors of the Issuer (the Injunction, § 1(e), "any action seeking to remove, replace ... any directors or officers of any Debtor"), submission of shareholder proposals to be "acted upon" by shareholders/members as part of a general meeting (the Injunction, § 1(c), "any steps to ... propose any matters to be acted upon by Mallinckrodt shareholders"), solicitation of proxies, any litigation against the Issuer or its officers and/or directors, among other restrictions of activities covered by that Injunction, requested by the Issuer and ordered by the Court.

	(f)	Holdings and Buxton are Michigan corporations. Parker is a citizen of the United States of America. The citizenship of each Individual Member is set forth on Schedule A.

Item 3.

Source and Amount of Funds or Other Considerations

Item 3 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

Funds for the purchase of the Shares reported herein were derived from available working capital of Buxton. Buxton purchased 510,936 Shares of the Issuer in open market purchases between January 12, 2021 and March 1, 2021 for a total of $162,503.38. Buxton also purchased an additional 52,628 Shares of the Issuer in open market purchases during the sixty (60) days preceding this amendment, for a total of $16,567.81. Buxton made other purchases of the Shares previously, also via available working capital.

The Reporting Persons collectively may be deemed to be the beneficial owner of, in the aggregate, 4,759,981 Shares. For the Individual Members, other than Elena Tsygankova, the Joan I. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13), and the John V. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13), whose funding for the Shares was derived from available working capital, the source of funding for the Shares was personal funds of the respective Individual Member.

Item 4.

Purpose of Transaction

Item 4 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

The Reporting Persons reserve the right, consistent with applicable law, to (i) acquire additional Shares and/or other equity, debt, notes, instruments or other securities (collectively, "Securities") of the Issuer (or its affiliates) in the open market or otherwise; (ii) dispose of any or all of their Securities in the open market or otherwise; and (iii) engage in any hedging or similar transactions with respect to the Securities. The Reporting Persons may engage in discussions with management or the Board of Directors of the Issuer concerning the business, operations, management, and future plans of the Issuer. Depending on various factors, including the Reporting Persons' financial position and investment strategy, the price of the Shares, conditions in the securities markets, and general economic and industry conditions, the Reporting Persons may in the future take such actions they deem appropriate and lawful.

On August 3, 2021, the Reporting Persons sent a letter via email (the "August 3, 2021, Letter") to the Issuer. The August 3, 2021, Letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.2 to the Amendment No. 2.

On July 7, 2021, the Reporting Persons sent a letter via email (the "July 7, 2021, Letter") to the Issuer. The July 7, 2021, Letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.3 to the Amendment No. 2.

On June 1, 2021, the Reporting Persons sent a letter via email (the "June 1, 2021, Letter") to the Issuer. The June 1, 2021, Letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.4 to the Amendment No. 2.

On May 20, 2021, the Reporting Persons sent a letter via email (the "May 20, 2021, Letter") to the Issuer. The May 20, 2021, Letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.5 to the Amendment No. 2.

On March 10, 2021, the Reporting Persons sent a letter via email (the "March 10, 2021, Letter") to the Issuer. The March 10, 2021, Letter is filed herewith as Exhibit 99.6 to the Amendment No. 2.

Item 5.

Interest in Securities of the Issuer

Item 5 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

(a)	As of the time of this filing, Holdings, Buxton, and Parker own 1,315,234 Shares of the Issuer, or a 1.6% ownership interest of the Issuer's Shares. Information regarding the Individual Members is set forth on Schedule B. Collectively, Holdings, Buxton, Parker, and the Individual Members own 4,759,981 Shares or a 5.6% ownership interest of the Issuer's Shares.

(b)	Number of Shares as to which such person has: (i) Sole Voting Power: Each of Holdings, Buxton, and Parker has the sole power to vote or direct the vote over 0 Shares. (ii) Shared Voting Power: Holdings has the shared power to vote or direct the vote over 1,315,234 Shares. Buxton has the shared power to vote or direct the vote over 1,315,234 Shares. Parker has the shared power to vote or direct the vote over 1,315,234 Shares. (iii) Sole Dispositive Power: Each of Holdings, Buxton, and Parker has the sole power to dispose or direct the disposition of 0 Shares. (iv) Shared Dispositive Power: Holdings has the shared power to dispose or to direct the direct the disposition of 1,315,234 Shares. Buxton has the shared power to dispose or to direct the direct the disposition of 1,315,234 Shares. Parker has the shared power to dispose or to direct the direct the disposition of 1,315,234 Shares. Information regarding the voting and dispositive power of the Individual Members is set forth on Schedule B.

(c)

The following table sets forth all transactions with respect to the Shares effected during the past sixty (60) days by any of the Reporting Persons, inclusive of any transactions effected through 4:00 p.m., New York City time, on August 1, 2021. Except as otherwise noted below, all such transactions were purchases of Shares effected in the open market, and the table includes commissions paid in per share prices.

Reporting Person	Date	Shares	Price of Security
Buxton	2021-07-09	6820	0.3398
Buxton	2021-07-09	300	0.3398
Buxton	2021-07-07	-1,280	0.3599
Buxton	2021-07-06	2500	0.35
Buxton	2021-07-06	3436	0.35
Buxton	2021-07-06	5616	0.355
Buxton	2021-07-06	5177	0.36
Buxton	2021-07-06	930	0.3172
Buxton	2021-07-06	3191	0.35
Buxton	2021-07-06	30	0.3488
Buxton	2021-07-06	762	0.3491
Buxton	2021-07-06	436	0.3491
Buxton	2021-07-06	4433	0.3545
Buxton	2021-07-06	76	0.3161
Buxton	2021-06-28	-12,123	0.431
Buxton	2021-06-28	-2,500	0.4301
Buxton	2021-06-28	-5,377	0.43
Buxton	2021-06-25	2026	0.4405
Buxton	2021-06-24	16	0.5199
Buxton	2021-06-23	2500	0.4355
Buxton	2021-06-23	1359	0.439
Buxton	2021-06-22	4,900	0.45595102
Buxton	2021-06-22	10,000	0.41
Buxton	2021-06-17	5,000	0.4001
Buxton	2021-06-16	-31,000	0.38
Buxton	2021-06-14	1590	0.32
Buxton	2021-06-14	44410	0.324
Buxton	2021-06-14	400	0.33
Buxton	2021-06-14	-1,000	0.32


(d)	N/A.

(e)	N/A.

Item 7.

Material to Be Filed as Exhibits

Item 7 of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

	1.	Joint Filing Agreement

	2.	Letter - August 2, 2021

	3.	Letter - July 7, 2021

	4.	Letter - June 1, 2021

	5.	Letter - May 20, 2021

	6.	Letter - March 10, 2021

Schedule A

Schedule A of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

Name	Principal Business Address or Residence	Principal Occupation or Employment/ Principal Business	Citizenship
Vladislav Dikii	Moscow, p. Pervomayskoe, Block 328, Bld. 96, bldg. 9	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Vladimir Kovalenko	246700 Pskov Pushkina street 611/1 Russia	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich	630550, OBL NOVOSIBIRSKAIA, R-N NOVOSIBIRSKII, S pazdolnoe, PER ZELENYI, DOM 28	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Elena Tsygankova	Moscow Rusakovskaya street 31	Financial Advisor	Russia
Thomas Gitter	17 Parklawn Place, Madison, WI 53705	Retired	USA
Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich	125315,G MOSKVA,PR-KT LENINGRADSKII,DOM 74/6,KV 76	Retired	Russia
Roman Dontsov Valentinovich	350005 Russia, Krasnodar, Alexandra Pokryshkina street 2 /2 apartment 416	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Alexey Isaev	Russian Federation. Moscow. Fryazevskaya street house 11.	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Alexander Koch	Jakob-Kaiser-Str. 14A, D-49088 Osnabrueck, Germany	Self-Employed	Germany
James Jonathan Josey	5319 Carolwood Drive, Jackson, MS 39211	Deputy CFO at The Molpus Woodlands Group, LLC Principal Business: Timber Investment Address: 858 North Street, Jackson, MS 39211	USA

Name	Principal Business Address or Residence	Principal Occupation or Employment/ Principal Business	Citizenship
Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi	2764 Tartus Dr., Jacksonville, FL 32246 USA	Doctor (Self-Employed)	USA
Edgard Gafurov	Russia Novocheboksarsk Vostochnaya street, house 1, building 2, apartment 54	Investor (Self-Employed)	USA
Kimberly Tully	4 South Deer Place, Hainesport, NJ 08036	Self-Employed (Consultant)	USA
Joan I. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)	3313 S. Victoria Drive, Blue Springs, MO 64015	Retired	USA
James Paul Carey	881 Southerford Avenue, Dayton, OH 45429	Patent Lawyer at Mane, Inc. Address: 2501 Henkle Drive, Lebanon, OH 45036	USA
Janice J. O'Connor	12808 S. Outer Belt Road, Lone Jack, MO 64070	Retired	USA
Andrew Gruber	215 Pleasant Street, Arlington MA 02476	Engineer at Qualcomm Principal Business: Wireless Technology Address: 5775 Morehouse Drive, San Diego CA 92121	USA
Yushenkova Olga Petrovna	Russia, Ryazan,Moscovskoe shosse d.33/4 kv.435	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Vanik Petrosian	Ul Vodopoinaia, d 19, kv 178, 357748, g Kislovodsk, Stavropolskii krai	Retired	Russia
Richard Barry	4532 Saint James Drive, Plano TX 75024	IT Management at United Surgical Partners Incorporated Principal Business: Ambulatory Surgery Services Address: 5601 Warren Parkway Frisco Texas, 75034	USA
Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich	Russia, Novosibirsk region, R, P Koltsovo 28	Investor (Self-Employed)	Russia
Chris Tichenor	400 Redding Road, Lexington, KY 40517	Retired	USA
Victor Pardo	11 Threepence Drive, Melville, NY 11747	Audio Engineer at Self-Employed Address: 1100 Haff Avenue, North Bellmore, NY 11710	USA
Alex Peter Wounlund	Bredholtvej 8, 2650 Hvidovre, Denmark	Key Account Manager at GlobalConnect Principal Business: Fiber Network Address: Havneholmen 6, 2450 Copenhagen, Denmark	Denmark

Name	Principal Business Address or Residence	Principal Occupation or Employment/ Principal Business	Citizenship
Petr Hoferek	9516 Park Drive, Unit 206, Omaha, NE 68127	Inventory Control at PAK Global LLC Principal Business: Industrial Fabrics and Hardware Address: 2528 South 156th Circle, Omaha, NE 68130	USA
John V. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)	3313 S. Victoria Drive, Blue Springs, MO 64015	Retired	USA
Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich	Russia, Kaluga, Duminichi, Molodezhnaya street 5a, 249300.	Self-Employed (Investor)	Russia
Mary Dunne	54 Hicks Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201	Retired	USA
Lisrael Larrondo	Medinaceli, 6, 6. 28660. Boadilla del Monte. Madrid. Spain	Renewable Energy Technician at PEMOG Principal Business: Energy Address: Juan Carlos I. 31. 28660. Boadilla del Monte. Madrid. Spain.	Spain
David Lamb	13560 NW Springville Road, Portland, OR 97229	Digital Design Engineer at Skyworks Solutions, Inc. Principal Business: Semiconductors Address: 1600 NW Compton Drive, Suite 300, Hillsboro, OR 97006	USA
Valerii Mansurov	Russia, Ufa city, Richard Zorge 64, 14	Construction Consultant Address: Russia, Ufa, Shota Rustaveli 9	Russia

Schedule B

Schedule B of Schedule 13D is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

Name	Aggregate Number of Shares Owned	Percentage of Class	Sole Voting Power	Shared Voting Power	Sole Dispositive Power	Shared Dispositive Power
Vladislav Dikii	220,000	0.3%	220,000	220,000	220,000	220,000
Vladimir Kovalenko	370,183	0.4%	370,183	370,183	370,183	370,183
Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich	255,000	0.3%	255,000	255,000	255,000	255,000
Elena Tsygankova	228,000	0.3%	228,000	228,000	228,000	228,000
Thomas Gitter	235,250	0.3%	235,250	235,250	235,250	235,250
Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich	193,000	0.2%	193,000	193,000	193,000	193,000
Roman Dontsov Valentinovich	135,212	0.2%	135,212	135,212	135,212	135,212
Alexey Isaev	121,347	0.1%	121,347	121,347	121,347	121,347
Alexander Koch	120,000	0.1%	120,000	120,000	120,000	120,000
James Jonathan Josey	111,400	0.1%	111,400	111,400	111,400	111,400
Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi	101,900	0.1%	101,900	101,900	101,900	101,900
Edgard Gafurov	96,512	0.1%	96,512	96,512	96,512	96,512
Kimberly Tully	95,060	0.1%	95,060	95,060	95,060	95,060
Joan I. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)	93,000	0.1%	93,000	93,000	93,000	93,000
James Paul Carey	90,000	0.1%	90,000	90,000	90,000	90,000
Janice J. O'Connor	84,000	0.1%	84,000	84,000	84,000	84,000
Andrew Gruber	60,000	0.1%	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000
Yushenkova Olga Petrovna	77,699	0.1%	77,699	77,699	77,699	77,699
Vanik Petrosian	74,300	0.1%	74,300	74,300	74,300	74,300
Richard Barry	72,285	0.1%	72,285	72,285	72,285	72,285
Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich	67,413	0.1%	67,413	67,413	67,413	67,413
Chris Tichenor	54,000	0.1%	54,000	54,000	54,000	54,000
Victor Pardo	52,080	0.1%	52,080	52,080	52,080	52,080
Alex Peter Wounlund	47,018	0.1%	47,018	47,018	47,018	47,018
Petr Hoferek	45,100	0.1%	45,100	45,100	45,100	45,100
John V. Barry Revocable Trust (Dtd. 12/13/13)	44,000	0.1%	44,000	44,000	44,000	44,000
Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich	40,000	0.0%	40,000	40,000	40,000	40,000
Mary Dunne	39,347	0.0%	39,347	39,347	39,347	39,347
Lisrael Larrondo	23,634	0.0%	23,634	23,634	23,634	23,634
David Lamb	17,632	0.0%	17,632	17,632	17,632	17,632
Valerii Mansurov	180,375	0.2%	180,375	180,375	180,375	180,375

SIGNATURE

After reasonable inquiry and to the best of my knowledge and belief, I certify that the information set forth in this statement is true, complete and correct.

BUXTON HELMSLEY HOLDINGS, INC.


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker
Title:	Director



THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker
Title:	Senior Managing Director



ALEXANDER E. PARKER


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker



VLADISLAV DIKII


By:	*/s/ Vladislav Dikii	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vladislav Dikii



VLADIMIR KOVALENKO


By:	*/s/ Vladimir Kovalenko	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vladimir Kovalenko



KHARKOV ALEKSANDR SERGEEVICH


By:	*/s/ Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich

ELENA TSYGANKOVA


By:	*/s/ Elena Tsygankova	August 2, 2021
Name:	Elena Tsygankova



THOMAS GITTER


By:	*/s/ Thomas Gitter	August 2, 2021
Name:	Thomas Gitter



DANILIUK KIRILL VLADIMIROVICH


By:	*/s/ Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich



ROMAN DONTSOV VALENTINOVICH


By:	*/s/ Roman Dontsov Valentinovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Roman Dontsov Valentinovich



ALEXEY ISAEV


By:	*/s/ Alexey Isaev	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexey Isaev



ALEXANDER KOCH


By:	*/s/ Alexander Koch	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander Koch


JAMES JONATHAN JOSEY


By:	*/s/ James Jonathan Josey	August 2, 2021
Name:	James Jonathan Josey

PRADEEP VASUDEVA KADAMBI


By:	*/s/ Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi	August 2, 2021
Name:	Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi



EDGARD GAFUROV


By:	*/s/ Edgard Gafurov	August 2, 2021
Name:	Edgard Gafurov



KIMBERLY TULLY


By:	*/s/ Kimberly Tully	August 2, 2021
Name:	Kimberly Tully



JOAN I. BARRY REVOCABLE TRUST (DTD. 12/13/13)


By:	*/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor
Title:	Co-Trustee



JAMES PAUL CAREY


By:	*/s/ James Paul Carey	August 2, 2021
Name:	James Paul Carey



JANICE J. O'CONNOR


By:	*/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor



ANDREW GRUBER


By:	*/s/ Andrew Gruber	August 2, 2021
Name:	Andrew Gruber


YUSHENKOVA OLGA PETROVNA


By:	*/s/ Yushenkova Olga Petrovna	August 2, 2021
Name:	Yushenkova Olga Petrovna



VANIK PETROSIAN


By:	*/s/ Vanik Petrosian	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vanik Petrosian



RICHARD BARRY


By:	*/s/ Richard Barry	August 2, 2021
Name:	Richard Barry



ZAVOLOZHIN SERGEY VLADIMIROVICH


By:	*/s/ Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich



CHRIS TICHENOR


By:	*/s/ Chris Tichenor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Chris Tichenor



VICTOR PARDO


By:	*/s/ Victor Pardo	August 2, 2021
Name:	Victor Pardo



ALEX PETER WOUNLUND


By:	*/s/ Alex Peter Wounlund	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alex Peter Wounlund


PETR HOFEREK


By:	*/s/ Petr Hoferek	August 2, 2021
Name:	Petr Hoferek



JOHN V. BARRY REVOCABLE TRUST (DTD. 12/13/13)


By:	*/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor
Title:	Co-Trustee



NEPIYVODA KIRILL NIKOLAEVICH


By:	*/s/ Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich



MARY DUNNE


By:	*/s/ Mary Dunne	August 2, 2021
Name:	Mary Dunne



LISRAEL LARRONDO


By:	*/s/ Lisrael Larrondo	August 2, 2021
Name:	Lisrael Larrondo



DAVID LAMB


By:	*/s/ David Lamb	August 2, 2021
Name:	David Lamb



VALERII MANSUROV


By:	*/s/ Valerii Mansurov	August 2, 2021
Name:	Valerii Mansurov




*By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker
Title:	Attorney-in-Fact

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.1 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

EXHIBIT 99.1

JOINT FILING AGREEMENT

In accordance with Rule 13d-1(k) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, the undersigned agree to the joint filing on behalf of each of them of a statement on Schedule 13D, including all amendments thereto, with respect to the ordinary shares, par value $0.20 per share, of Mallinckrodt plc, and further agree that this Joint Filing Agreement shall be included as an exhibit to the first such joint filing and may, as required, be included as an exhibit to subsequent amendments thereto.

Each of the undersigned agrees and acknowledges that each party hereto is (i) individually eligible to use such Schedule 13D and (ii) responsible for the timely filing of such Schedule 13D and any and all amendments thereto, and for the completeness and accuracy of the information concerning such party contained therein; provided that no party is responsible for the completeness and accuracy of the information concerning any other party unless such party knows or has reason to believe that such information is inaccurate.

Each of the undersigned hereby constitutes and appoints Alexander E. Parker as their true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, for him and in his name, place and stead, in any and all capacities, to sign any and all amendments to the statement on Schedule 13D, and to file the same, with exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection therewith, with the Securities and Exchange Commission, granting unto said attorney-in-fact and agent, full power and authority to do and perform each and every act and thing necessary or desirable to be done in and about the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby ratifying and confirming all that said attorney-in-fact and agent, or his substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

This Joint Filing Agreement may be executed in any number of counterparts, all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument. A facsimile or other reproduction of this Joint Filing Agreement may be executed by one or more parties hereto, and an executed copy of this Joint Filing Agreement may be delivered by one or more parties hereto by facsimile or similar instantaneous electronic transmission device pursuant to which the signature of or on behalf of such party can be seen, and such execution and delivery shall be considered valid, binding and effective for all purposes as of the date hereof.

Dated: August 2, 2021

[SIGNATURE PAGES FOLLOW]

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hereby execute this Joint Filing Agreement as of the date first written above.

BUXTON HELMSLEY HOLDINGS, INC.


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker
Title:	Director



THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker
Title:	Senior Managing Director



ALEXANDER E. PARKER


By:	/s/ Alexander E. Parker	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander E. Parker



VLADISLAV DIKII


By:	/s/ Vladislav Dikii	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vladislav Dikii




VLADIMIR KOVALENKO


By:	/s/ Vladimir Kovalenko	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vladimir Kovalenko




KHARKOV ALEKSANDR SERGEEVICH


By:	/s/ Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Kharkov Aleksandr Sergeevich




ELENA TSYGANKOVA


By:	/s/ Elena Tsygankova	August 2, 2021
Name:	Elena Tsygankova

THOMAS GITTER


By:	/s/ Thomas Gitter	August 2, 2021
Name:	Thomas Gitter




DANILIUK KIRILL VLADIMIROVICH


By:	/s/ Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Daniliuk Kirill Vladimirovich




ROMAN DONTSOV VALENTINOVICH


By:	/s/ Roman Dontsov Valentinovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Roman Dontsov Valentinovich




ALEXEY ISAEV


By:	/s/ Alexey Isaev	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexey Isaev




ALEXANDER KOCH


By:	/s/ Alexander Koch	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alexander Koch




JAMES JONATHAN JOSEY


By:	/s/ James Jonathan Josey	August 2, 2021
Name:	James Jonathan Josey




PRADEEP VASUDEVA KADAMBI


By:	/s/ Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi	August 2, 2021
Name:	Pradeep Vasudeva Kadambi

EDGARD GAFUROV


By:	/s/ Edgard Gafurov	August 2, 2021
Name:	Edgard Gafurov




KIMBERLY TULLY


By:	/s/ Kimberly Tully	August 2, 2021
Name:	Kimberly Tully




JOAN I. BARRY REVOCABLE TRUST (DTD. 12/13/13)


By:	/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor
Title:	Co-Trustee




JAMES PAUL CAREY


By:	/s/ James Paul Carey	August 2, 2021
Name:	James Paul Carey




JANICE J. O'CONNOR


By:	/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor




ANDREW GRUBER


By:	/s/ Andrew Gruber	August 2, 2021
Name:	Andrew Gruber




YUSHENKOVA OLGA PETROVNA


By:	/s/ Yushenkova Olga Petrovna	August 2, 2021
Name:	Yushenkova Olga Petrovna

VANIK PETROSIAN


By:	/s/ Vanik Petrosian	August 2, 2021
Name:	Vanik Petrosian




RICHARD BARRY


By:	/s/ Richard Barry	August 2, 2021
Name:	Richard Barry




ZAVOLOZHIN SERGEY VLADIMIROVICH


By:	/s/ Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Zavolozhin Sergey Vladimirovich




CHRIS TICHENOR


By:	/s/ Chris Tichenor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Chris Tichenor




VICTOR PARDO


By:	/s/ Victor Pardo	August 2, 2021
Name:	Victor Pardo




ALEX PETER WOUNLUND


By:	/s/ Alex Peter Wounlund	August 2, 2021
Name:	Alex Peter Wounlund




PETR HOFEREK


By:	/s/ Petr Hoferek	August 2, 2021
Name:	Petr Hoferek

JOHN V. BARRY REVOCABLE TRUST (DTD. 12/13/13)


By:	/s/ Janice J. O'Connor	August 2, 2021
Name:	Janice J. O'Connor
Title:	Co-Trustee




NEPIYVODA KIRILL NIKOLAEVICH


By:	/s/ Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich	August 2, 2021
Name:	Nepiyvoda Kirill Nikolaevich




MARY DUNNE


By:	/s/ Mary Dunne	August 2, 2021
Name:	Mary Dunne




LISRAEL LARRONDO


By:	/s/ Lisrael Larrondo	August 2, 2021
Name:	Lisrael Larrondo




DAVID LAMB


By:	/s/ David Lamb	August 2, 2021
Name:	David Lamb




VALERII MANSUROV


By:	/s/ Valerii Mansurov	August 2, 2021
Name:	Valerii Mansurov

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.2 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

New York Headquarters		Mr. Alexander E. Parker
1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3		Senior Managing Director
New York, N.Y. 10036		E. alexander.parker@buxtonhelmsley.com
		T. +1 (212) 951-1530
		F. +1 (212) 641-4349

VIA REGISTERED U.S. POSTAL MAIL AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
richard.daly@broadridge.com; chris.perry@broadridge.com; tim.gokey@broadridge.com; shareholder@broadridge.com;
board.directors@mnk.com; info@odce.ie; marian_lynch@odce.ie; xana_mccarthy@odce.ie; suzanne_gunne@odce.ie;
ian_drennan@odce.ie;

August 2, 2021

Board of Directors - All Members	Mr. Angus Russell, Chairman
Mallinckrodt Plc.	Mr. Mark Trudeau, Director
53 Frontage Road, Shelbourne Building	Mr. David Carlucci, Director
Hampton, N.J. 08827	Mr. J. Martin Carroll, Director
	Mr. Paul R. Carter, Director
	Mr. David Norton, Director
	Ms. Anne C. Whitaker, Director
	Ms. Joann Reed, Director
	Mr. Kneeland Youngblood, Director
	Mr. Carlos V. Paya, M.D., Ph. D., Director


Broadridge, Inc.	Mr. Richard Daly, Executive Chairman
1155 Long Island Avenue	Mr. Chris Perry, President
Edgewood, N.Y. 11717	Mr. Tim Gokey, Chief Executive Officer


Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement	Ms. Marian Lynch
16 Parnell Square	Ms. Xana McCarthy, Investigator
Dublin 1	Ms. Suzanne Gunne, Enforcement Lawyer
D01 W5C2, Ireland	Mr. Ian Drennan, Director of Corporate Enforcement

Re: Failure of Response to Critical Integrity Issues/Concerns Raised to Board of Directors - Mallinckrodt Plc.

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Board:

This letter is being addressed to the Mallinckrodt Plc. (the "Company") board of directors (the "Board"), due to your failure to respond entirely (despite our courtesy attempt of closed-door communications) to the June 1, 2021, and July 7, 2021, letters to the Board from The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. ("BHG"). In that most recent July 7 letter, we raised the ultimate of possible integrity concerns/issues, entirely relating to your most recent stunt that takes your violations of Irish law and breaches of fiduciary duty to unimaginable levels: The upcoming August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting and according "election", which you are attempting to certify as a legitimate, democratic renewal of your directorships under the most fallacious, illegal, and immoral pretenses possible. Toward the end of this letter, I have also thrown in an additional ten violations of Irish law and the Companies Act of 2014 (the "Act"). The more BHG and its counsel reviews your conduct alongside that Act's statutes, we find that the known violations are the utter tip of the iceberg - it is beyond flabbergasting what you believe you are going to get away with.

Before I even begin, I am going to, as I also did when I privately delivered BHG's July 7, 2021, letter to the Board, remind you of the Mallinckrodt Plc. Guide to Business Conduct. You so interestingly took the opportunity to point out that corporate governance document in your July 2, 2021, proxy statement filing. That Guide to Business Conduct was drafted by this Company's directors and is the framework of ethical business conduct which you took an oath to comply with upon acceptance of your directorship positions.

Specifically, and ironically, you took the time to highlight that the
Mallinckrodt Plc. Guide to Business Conduct:

"Prohibits any employee from retaliating against anyone for
raising or helping to resolve an integrity question."

BHG reminds you of this clearly ongoing policy of the Company, being you took the time to cite it, but already have violated it with your lawsuit against shareholders after they raised massive integrity issues/concerns that you never addressed, nor even responded to (except with your retaliation against shareholders raising integrity issues/concerns in the form of your lawsuit, which was the absolute first time BHG "heard" from our fiduciaries). In light of nothing but utter silence from our fiduciaries at the time of such critically unsettling integrity issues/concerns being raised, this shareholder base was left with no other recourse but to pursue our rights under the Act, with the possible calling of an extraordinary general meeting to dismiss you for cause and replace you. Rather than that causing you to change course and react in accordance with your fiduciary duties by addressing and resolving such numerous and massive integrity concerns/issues that you had ignored thus far (whether you addressed/resolved those concerns through written communication or via the telephonic conference that we were forced to formally demand through a 13-D filing), instead you responded by slapping a lawsuit on BHG to muzzle your entire shareholder base, in complete violation of the Act, § 212 (that statute, absolutely prohibiting minority shareholder oppression, without exception). That violation of actual Irish law (and not just our Guide to Business Conduct) was a much more serious offense than your retaliatory lawsuit against those raising integrity concerns was already. Then, as if it could not get worse, the Company further demonstrated their intentions by making a false statement before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, gaslighting The Honorable John T. Dorsey and all present, falsely stating that this Company was not traded on any regulated exchange in a European Union member state, when BHG had just before explicitly pointed out to Judge Dorsey that the Company's stock traded under ticker "MCD" on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. After giving the exact ticker on the exact stock exchange, BHG went even so far thereafter to define when Germany became a member state of the European Union, yet you still made a contrived and false statement on the record of the court that this Company was not traded on any regulated exchange in the European Union, falsely portraying that this shareholder base did not have the right to call an extraordinary general meeting under the Act, §§ 178, 1099, and 1101 (§ 1101, lowering the necessary quorum for an EGM to 5% of outstanding shares, since this Company is an Irish-incorporated PLC and its shares are traded on a regulated exchange in a European Union member state, which is Germany's Frankfurt Stock Exchange). And if you want to claim that you and your counsel did not even know where your shares are traded, that is the exact reason why so many at this reorganization table believe that those on the side of the Company in this reorganization are either completely incompetent or unethical (I will give you the liberty of picking which word, as one of them most definitely applies). And if you were not aware of where your shares are traded, then you are still dishonestly going along with an erroneous statement because it is convenient thereafter for your motives (you have not corrected course after all of BHG's letters to the Board, so we must assume your course is intentional), which is equally as shameful. I will lastly note that your actions can never be in line with your fiduciary duties when you label those whom you have a fiduciary duty to as an "adversary" (as you did in your "adversary complaint" filed against BHG). How perplexing… As held In Re Systems Services Building Group, Ltd. [2020], a directors' fiduciary duties to the entirety of a Company's capital structure survives even absolute insolvency (even throughout reorganization/liquidation proceedings). Whether you are fond of your shareholder base or not, the High Court of Ireland has not authorized you to strike us from the record, so you are entirely violating your fiduciary duties to your shareholders, whether you think you owe them to us or not. With BHG having been personally contacted by a sizable portion of your shareholder base (much larger than the quorum required to call an EGM), I can tell you that your shareholders are far from fond of you all, but the difference is that we own this Company that you have absolutely hijacked it in complete violation of the Act, § 212. Whether you think your way of course is ethical or not, it is up to this shareholder base to deal with our business as we wish (as proven by the Act, § 680, requiring uninterrupted shareholder meetings and votes, even during an insolvent Irish company's liquidation proceedings, to ensure that directors are completely upholding their duties to the entire capital structure of even an insolvent company, including shareholders).

Page 2 of 12

Since you do not take our letters seriously when we give you the benefit of not airing out such integrity concerns publicly, BHG's past three letters are being included in a (simultaneous to this letter) 13-D filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, so that those whom you have a fiduciary duty to and the investing public can see the ultimate integrity issues that you have not resolved, nor merely even attempted to address. This letter and those disclosed as part of the simultaneous 13-D filing very clearly include no actions intended or proposed to be taken during U.S. restructuring proceedings and, in fact, reaffirm that shareholders are allowed to take no actions at all, as is also very clear with your restraining order governing the actions of your entire shareholder base. BHG would not feel comfortable accepting your board seats, even if you offered them today - you are here to stay until you can explain yourselves before the High Court of Ireland, and we are making sure of it. As much as you want to gag your shareholder base though, we are indeed allowed to speak, as long as it is not false statements that we are making (just because our opinion does not match yours does not make it misleading), and we have a right to air out all violations of this Company to this shareholder base so that they are educated on all of the acts, violations, and absolute breaches of duty this Board and management are trying to sweep under the rug. Even if the U.S. Court is not enforcing Irish law right now, that does not give you an excuse, nor a right, to continue to knowingly violate it, and act as though it does not exist. Your violations and breaches are seemingly and alarmingly heightening by the day. This letter (and those letters included in the 13-D filing simultaneous to this letter) merely (and, rightfully) inform shareholders of the numerous integrity issues/concerns that BHG has raised, that this Board has not even attempted to resolve, and has provided no justification for as fiduciaries of this Company. Again, your claim of insolvency does not relieve you of your fiduciary duty to every part of the capital structure under Irish law, including shareholders (no matter how much you wish they did not exist). You do not lose that duty (an unchanged duty) until the Irish High Court sanctions your "scheme" and authorizes you to strike your shareholders from the record. Your mere, unsupported response of "we disagree with the assertions made therein" to BHG's May 20, 2021, letter to the Board, raising already-massive integrity issues/concerns before this "election" was scheduled, could not be more tasteless, inappropriate, and incongruous with your duties (as we note in our June 1, 2021, for all shareholders to see). Those few words are the response you have for ten full pages (just that first letter) of unreservedly alarming integrity issues/concerns raised, with no justification? Then, you did not even take the time to merely respond with anything at all to the letters from June 1, 2021, and July 7, 2021 (not even an acknowledgement)? By including this letter, and those past three letters (again, the last two of which you never even acknowledged receipt of), in a public 13-D filing, you have no excuse as to not having received them or otherwise. If you want to claim that it was inappropriate to publicly distribute these letters, then take your fiduciary duty seriously when you are given the courtesy of receiving such disconcerting letters behind closed doors.

As noted in the July 7, 2021, letter from BHG to the Board, you did not disclose to the U.S. Bankruptcy Court (at the time of the hearings on your requested restraining order against your shareholder base) that, when you wished "to enjoin the shareholder meeting" (directly your words, from your "adversary" complaint against your own shareholders whom you have a fiduciary duty to) possibly being called by BHG because such a possible shareholder meeting would cause such "irreparable harm", you would then then turn around and attempt running such an inherently fraudulent/tampered meeting and "election", where your shareholders are prohibited from voting against directors (directly from the restraining order, an "action seeking to remove … any directors or officers of any Debtor"), barred from submitting any director nominations as alternatives to existing directors, barred from submitting absolutely any shareholder proposals (directly from the injunction, prohibiting "any steps to … schedule … or to propose any matters to be acted upon by Mallinckrodt shareholders"). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court barred the meeting you wished to enjoin from occurring, so that a meeting would not occur at all, because you, our Board, and the Company, again, claimed any such possible meeting allowing your shareholders' voices to be heard would cause such "irreparable harm"; that was not to allow you to run an unquestionably fake and tampered election. To be clear, as also noted in the July 7, 2021, letter from BHG to the Board, we are telling you that you need to sit in your seats to face the High Court of Ireland after all you have done behind Ireland's back (BHG wants no chance that you will have an excuse to leave your positions through being "voted out"), but you are not going to stay in those seats on this attempted false premise that you properly held a meeting for your democratic re-election, as that is factually false, and beyond a lie (the Irish High Court can determine whether or not you have crossed into the realm of fraud). While your term as a director is therefore no longer rightfully renewed and I do not understand quite how you are going to explain to the High Court of Ireland how you can still be in your positions without a proper, valid, genuinely democratic re-election (free of violations of the Act, § 212), you must have some explanation for everything else you are doing, so I am sure you can cook up another irrational rationalization of violating Irish law for this violation of the Act, § 175, too. There was supposed to be no meeting at all because, as you - again - stated, it would cause "irreparable harm" - that was not a cue, nor an authorization, to run a fraudulent and manufactured one. Your attempt to maintain a false front of compliance with the Act, § 175 (statutorily requiring annual general meetings of the directors be held no further than 15 months from the previous), is your inherent admission that you have no right (under Irish law, as an Ireland-incorporated company, which seems to continually slip your mind, as you obviously continue to believe you are on some vacation from the laws of your home country) to strip the voice/rights of your shareholders, or use a foreign court to side-step those statutory obligations under the Act relating to shareholder rights, annual general meetings, and extraordinary general meetings, including the circumstances under which they are statutorily required to be held (in the case of an annual general meeting, no more than 15 months after the previous annual general meeting, and in the case of an extraordinary general meeting, upon the requisition of shareholders representing the proper quorum under the Act, §§ 178, 1099, and 1101). It is impossible to be compliant with the Act, § 175, while having already stripped the rights of your shareholders in complete violation of the Act, § 212, with a literal restraining order. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court, again, nowhere in that order, authorized this Board to hold an inherently fraudulent election after you wished to enjoin a shareholder meeting from occurring altogether (then thought you would attempt running a manufactured one), endeavoring a then-fraudulent certification of a then-tampered/false "election" and its "results". The manufactured "election" you are saying Broadridge should certify is the same as if the management and Board scavenged the ballot box and threw out the votes of their dissident shareholders before they could be counted, or (on a larger scale) just as if the President of the United States ordered all individuals who attempted to submit votes against him/her or any other potential nominees on their ballot be jailed. What a corrupt scheme you are attempting, and I know that Broadridge and its shareholders will not wish to be a part of it after this letter, which contains only everything that you should have disclosed already. Broadridge, just like the auditor of a public company, is certifying the absolute legitimacy of reported results, free of tampering (in one case, financial results, and - in another case - voting/poll results). If Broadridge were to say this election is certifiable because the number of votes "against" and "for" merely numerically are what they counted (then, deeming those numbers certifiable, legitimate election results), that would be the equivalent of Arthur Andersen certifying the financial statements of Enron merely because - at face value - the management-submitted balance sheet's assets, minus liabilities, equaled the line stating shareholder's equity. I do not think anyone would dispute that such a perfunctory criterion of face value substantiation for what constitutes certifiable, "legitimate results" fared quite poorly for Arthur Andersen. Being so, I do not believe Broadridge will choose such a mirror perilous definition of "certifiable results" to appease this Board and management putting forth such a charade (the High Court of Ireland can decide if this is attempted fraud). That would - again - be the precise equivalent of Arthur Andersen taking the position that they merely make sure that, again, the assets minus liabilities, on the balance sheet, equal the shareholder's equity line. That would also be the equivalent of, before the internet-age, an inspector of elections (as part of an in-person only shareholder meeting, with no electronic voting access) stating that they will certify the legitimacy of election results when no shareholder puts a hand up (no votes cast) after shareholders are polled for those "against" present directors, yet the inspector is fully aware that every shareholder had a gun to their head at the time when the board of directors "polled" for the votes of their dissident shareholders. These examples sound like some sort of comical parody and joke, but that is what you, the Board, have made of this Company. Such iniquitous pretenses render any possible results uncertifiable, even before results can begin being tabulated, due to the irrefutable interference and tampering by this Board and management before votes could even possibly be slipped into the "ballot box" (before ballots were even delivered to your constituency, actually). You, the Board, interfered with the legitimacy of your own election, and dishonestly did not disclose it (not even in your proxy statement to the investing public, and therefore also the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, so I highly doubt you did to Broadridge either). If you made proper disclosures, you would not have even gotten this far with planning to run such a sham of an "election", so it is not the fault of your shareholders for having to disclose and bring to light such material facts because you chose to disreputably stuff them under the rug yourselves. It would not be the "fault" of BHG for disclosing the facts that you had an absolute duty to, if you had just done what you were legally obligated to from the get-go, so hang up the fatuous blame-shifting.

Page 3 of 12

As I note in my July 7, 2021, letter, I highly doubt you disclosed to Broadridge (your chosen inspector of elections), at the time you engaged them for certification of the legitimacy of your re-election as directors of this Company, that you had an active restraining order dictatorially prohibiting your shareholders from voting against directors (again, "any action seeking to remove … any directors or officers of any Debtor"), and allowing you to hold them in literal contempt of court if they do. If you had disclosed that to Broadridge, knowing the ethical standards of Broadridge myself, they would have never taken on the engagement to begin with. Beyond the prohibition of voting against directors, you also (very incurably and fatally) tampered and manufactured the results of your attempted "election" (rendering the ballot invalid, from the start, fatally, and irreversibly, even if you lifted the restraining order today, given its missing possible proposals and nominations that were already precluded, in violation of Irish law and our corporate charter) by:

Prohibiting possible director nominations by any shareholder (see § 6 of the injunctive order), in direct violation of our corporate charter and the Act, § 212 (directly from the injunction, prohibiting "any action seeking to … nominate, appoint … any directors or officers of any Debtor").
Prohibiting submission of any possible shareholder proposals by any shareholder (again, see § 6 of the injunctive order), in direct violation of our corporate charter and the Act, § 212 (directly from the injunction, prohibiting "any steps to … schedule … or to propose any matters to be acted upon by Mallinckrodt shareholders").

Page 4 of 12

You are nefariously and illegitimately attempting to renew your directorships at the upcoming August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, while you:

1. Have a formal restraining order prohibiting your entire dissident shareholder base from casting votes against you (in direct violation of the Act, § 212, unequivocally prohibiting shareholder oppression), and allowing the Board to hold shareholders in actual contempt of court, if a shareholder should vote against directors (directly from the injunctive order, an "action seeking to remove … any directors or officers of any Debtor").

2. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you neglect to disclose the, without question, material fact of a restraining order existing and restricting the actions of your entire shareholder base, and how it will fatally tamper, manipulate, and manufacture your election results, before shareholders even get delivery of their voting ballots.

3. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you inherently admit active and incurable violation of multiple articles of this Company's corporate charter (specifically, this shareholder base's absolute right to submit director nominations, submit shareholder proposals, and otherwise, which we were, to the hilt, coerced and legally precluded by this Board from doing, in direct violation of the corporate charter you took an oath to uphold, and in direct violation of the Act, § 212).

4. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you do not disclose your active oppression of shareholder rights (I know you will never, verbatim, admit a violation of the Act, § 212, citing that statute, but you have undeniably restricted the rights of your shareholders, which is absolute, undeniable restriction of rights of your shareholders that must be disclosed, no matter if that oppression of rights was "consented" to under duress or not) with your restraining order against your entire shareholder base. You do not disclose how that oppression fatally alters the democracy (and, therefore, legitimacy) of the annual general meeting and any business matters voted on (directors voted on, etc.).

5. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you do not disclose the active and unrectified violation of the Company's Guide to Business Conduct, where you are ongoingly retaliating against all shareholders (with your active restraining order restricting the activities/rights of your entire shareholder base) after they raised previous integrity concerns/issues, instead of resolving those integrity concerns/issues, as is your fiduciary duty. Your hollow allegations in your "adversary complaint" against BHG, used as a distorted excuse and front to push your hidden agenda of oppressing this entire shareholder base, would never even possibly exist, if you would have merely addressed and resolved the critical integrity issues/concerns raised by shareholders, instead of letting such critical issues/concerns go unanswered until the point that your constituency saw no other choice but to explore their absolute rights under Irish law to dismiss and replace you. The fact you let the situation go so far as you did where such allegations were even possible, is your fault - far from the fault of your shareholder base. Of course, BHG knew you would fail to list your active retaliation against shareholders (in violation of Irish law, the Act, and the Company's Guide to Business Conduct), but it is your duty to properly disclose all circumstances and facts for which shareholders should base whether you are worthy of being possibly re-elected, and that certainly would change the decisions of many voters, since you cannot even follow the rules you took an oath to uphold, many of which were drafted and vouched for by current directors themselves. As stated before, with BHG being forced to disclose these very material facts here that the Board omitted and were fully aware of and should have already on your own, if you want to claim that BHG bringing them to light is an issue, you are blame-shifting and gaslighting yet again when this entire situation was entirely avoidable if you made proper disclosures on your own, merely upheld your fiduciary duties, and maintained compliance with Irish law.

6. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you do not disclose that you have beyond coerced your entire shareholder base to prevent their submission of any director nominations, and - in fact - went so far as to obtain a formal restraining order to forcefully preclude your shareholders from submitting director nominations (directly from the restraining order, prohibiting "any action seeking to … nominate, appoint … any directors or officers of any Debtor"), so that you may hold them in contempt of court if they do attempt the submission of director nominations. By virtue of § 6 of the injunction, you make it clear that any shareholder (far beyond BHG) violating the active restraining order, upon an attempt to include a nomination, would result in the Company being able to hold them in contempt of court, with your reliance on that § 6 of the injunction (otherwise you would not have included that part of the order). You also do not disclose that director nominations have been virtually thrown out and are not on the ballot because you would not even consider them and were outright denying their submission so that you could ensure the present Board remains the only directors listed on the ballot, in complete violation of the Act, § 212. You then outright lie in the proxy statement filing and demonstrate absolute guilt in breaching our corporate charter (that you took an oath to uphold and comply with at all times) when you state on page 23 of the proxy filing that "as provided in its charter, the Governance and Compliance Committee will consider nominations submitted by shareholders". Are you joking? You also do not disclose the effects of your effective tampering of the ballot (the directors available to be voted) and how it will fatally restrict/manufacture the results of the election to prevent any new Board members from being instituted. You also do not disclose how, without the restraining order, the outcome of the annual general meeting, election, and business matters being voted on could be materially different.

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7. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you do not disclose that shareholder proposals are missing (because any possible proposal submission would allow the Company to hold the submitter to be held in contempt of court, per § 6 of the restraining order), that shareholders were coerced to prevent submission of any shareholder proposals, and that you went so far as to obtain a restraining order to allow you, our fiduciaries, to hold shareholders in contempt of court if they attempted the submission of a shareholder proposal (the same as the issue with shareholders being barred from nominating additional directors). You do not disclose that the outcome of the general meeting undeniably could result in a very materially different outcome for the Company, if shareholders were not oppressed and restricted from being allowed to submit shareholder proposals (for instance, directors could not only be dismissed, but also dismissed for cause, if such a proposal was allowed to be put forth as BHG wished to). You also do not disclose that shareholders would, due to the injunctive order against your entire shareholder base, be subject to violation of the restraining order, § 1(c), if they were to bring proposals to the floor at the actual annual general meeting, autocratically completely silencing your entire shareholder base (any shareholder could potentially be labeled by the Board as "acting in concert", as worded in your injunctive order), in absolute violation of the Act, § 1104 (providing that shareholders/members have the right to place items on the agenda of an annual general meeting of the members/shareholders). And if you want to make the bogus claim that it was just those in the 13-D group established by BHG who were barred from submitting proposals and/or nominations, then you are admitting violation of the Act, § 1100 (categorically prohibiting anything but equal treatment of members/shareholders of a traded PLC).

8. Within your proxy statement filing for the August 13, 2021, Annual General Meeting, you do not disclose that not one Board member or executive officer (not one single person out of all of you) were in compliance with this Company's ongoing minimum equity ownership "requirements" as of even the Chapter 11 petition filing date (and most all of you, many months before that), which was nearly a month before you decided to "waive" those equity retention requirements. You also sporadically, falsely, use "guideline" as a substitute for the word "requirement" in the proxy statement filing, when they were never optional or anything near a soft "guideline". You do not disclose those active violations before you waived the requirements, and - again - that would change the mind of many voters as to whether you can be trusted in your positions or not, when you cannot even follow the rules that were vouched for by those in your position. That is a major, material deficiency of the proxy statement and omission of fact. You have been made aware of this major deficiency and omission in BHG's July 7, 2021, letter to the Board, yet you still have not cured this major disclosure deficiency (although, also unsure as to how you even could), because you know it would very much change the opinions of shareholders as to whether or not they would vote for you. As further noted in BHG's July 7, 2021, letter to the Board, your failure to disclose your active violation of ongoing equity retention requirements (every single director and executive officer), well before those stock ownership requirements were conveniently "waived" by the Board, preys on the fact that your shareholder base is now dominantly non-institutional (given, your transition from the NYSE to the OTC markets), and therefore that most all of your current shareholders that read your proxy statement and receive a voting ballot do not even know what a Form 4 filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is, let alone how to read one. Underhanded, is a very fitting word for your proxy statement (this whole situation, really), to say the least.

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Notwithstanding the above numbered list, you may refer to the full laundry list of integrity concerns/issues also discussed within the July 7, 2021, letter from BHG to the Board, along with the past two letters before that (for the convenience of all, included in the 13-D filing simultaneous to this letter).

Before I get to a list of additional violations of the Act identified just since our July 7, 2021, letter, I will very pithily tell you to drop the absolute load of boloney that your illegal attempt to oppress your shareholders and strip them of their rights was "consented" to. Your mere request (the initial request) to obtain an injunctive order against shareholders to oppress their rights and interests is illegal under Irish law on its own (per the Act, § 212, "powers of the directors of the company … being exercised … in a manner oppressive to … any of the members") - it is the equivalent of attempted assault, which is a crime in itself, even if you were not successful in the full crime of assault. An act is also not "consent" when the party "consenting" is being coerced by fiduciaries and under absolute duress. Your successful coercion does not make your illegal act legal - what a convoluted pipe dream, if that is your rationale. I will also add, the initial restraining order was met with a 45-minute oral argument by BHG as to why the restraining order requested in violation of the Act, § 212, should not have been instituted (far from the "consent" you misleadingly claim), outlaying the Board and management of this Company's numerous violations of Irish law, our corporate governance rules, mirror breaches of duty for which directors were held personally liable in Irish High Court cases, etc., as to why shareholders were exercising their rights for very meritful reasons. After the "temporary" restraining order was forced on BHG, despite its 45-minute argument before the court as to why it should not be issued (again, far from consent, and - in fact - the complete opposite), then, leading up to the trial for making that "temporary" restraining order permanent, your legal counsel threatened BHG through our legal counsel that you would drag out depositions and trials based on allegations that included alleged violation of statutes for which no private cause of action even exists (you cannot create a private cause of action to rely on out of thin air), which means your main goal with that litigation (with no legal grounds to sue as a private entity, given no private cause of action to rely on) was to harass BHG and myself with those claims for which you had no right to file suit over as a private entity, also in complete violation of your fiduciary duties (and, again your Guide to Business Conduct). Then, due to the coercion of the Company toward BHG, BHG then "consented" to a restraining order remaining in place due to threats made to BHG by the Company, in complete retaliation for BHG's exercising of their rights under Irish law when fiduciaries are not fulfilling their duties (not even merely attempting to address integrity issues/concerns being raised). The restraining order was far from consented to being actually instituted (again, a 45-minute oral argument as to why it should not have been instituted), but was only "consented" to remain in place due to the duress at hand as a result of the Company's threats, as BHG also knew the restraining order would anyways remain in place, even if a full trial was conducted, given that the U.S. court very seemingly did not care if the Company was violating Irish law, so there was no purpose in BHG spending countless thousands to defend why the restraining order was not meritful, if the U.S. court already was of the position that they apparently did not care about Irish law. With your 13-D allegations (which there is absolutely no private cause of action for you to rely on, again, making them absolute harassment), you criticize this shareholder base for how well they assembled to regain control of this Company because our fiduciary directors were not acting in the best interest of the entirety of the capital structure (again, as held to be required even through absolute insolvency In Re Systems Services Building Group, Ltd. [2020]), similar to a robbery victim being criticized by their attacker for having "assaulted" them through their physical defense of themselves as a means of allowing an opportunity to run from the attacker - that is a disgraceful and beyond appalling aspect of the situation to focus on as part of your perspective relative to it. Those claims against BHG were - again - a mere scapegoat and façade for your hidden agenda of getting a muzzle on your shareholders, far beyond BHG (crystal clear from § 6 of the injunctive order). Beyond that, this entire shareholder base did not "consent" (as you misleadingly tout that term to the public, to my legal counsel, and in letters to BHG) to that cram-down gag order. BHG had the choice of "accepting" it while under duress, for the High Court of Ireland to intervene when possible, or face your threatened continued litigation based on statutes for which no private cause of action even exists (therefore, making it vexatious litigation), and the previous option was the lesser evil - BHG and this shareholder base was going to be oppressed by this Board either way. So, while I know your argument to the High Court of Ireland will be that your gag order was not "oppression" because you got "consent" from my firm under duress, your lawyers are very competent, so I would believe they are aware that duress rids the validity of "consent". And no matter if you received "consent" or not, oppression of minority shareholders is still in violation of the Act, § 212 - unless we proposed our own gag order, it is illegal. The mere fact that you even requested a gag order is already an attempted violation of your duties and the Act, § 212 - I certainly did not request an order to enjoin my own rights and never would have proposed it, obviously. The High Court of Ireland will see this situation for what it is - I am very confident in that. This entire shareholder base has a claim against all directors and this management for your oppression of every shareholder under your fiduciary duty. While you also will likely try to claim that the active injunctive order only lists BHG, and therefore was not meant to oppress every shareholder, it is very clear through § 6 of your injunctive order, that it applies to all shareholders - that is coercion and oppression of every shareholder. The spirit of the injunctive order, very clearly, was to cover any shareholder that could possibly violate those statutory and constitutional rights which you forcefully stripped from your shareholder base. That is abundantly clear. While you also might try claiming that only BHG is prohibited from voting against directors, that is false, as if another shareholder (any shareholder in this shareholder base) were to submit a shareholder proposal to dismiss all directors for cause, they would be subject to violation (and consequential effect) of the injunctive order, § 1(d), and possible contempt of court under § 6 of the order, so your injunctive order covers them as well - you do not get to pick the bits and pieces that apply to individual shareholders in an attempt to make yourselves look better (prejudicial treatment across shareholders is, again, a violation of the Act, § 1100). It is utterly clear that your "consent" argument is entirely fallacious and misleading, as the order's initial institution was argued orally by BHG for 45 minutes before its unconsented institution, in violation of the Act, § 212, every other shareholder in this shareholder base had no part in the "consent" (that "consent" under duress was to merely allow the unconsented to and contested/objected to order to remain, after your coercion of BHG) you continually attempt to allude to, and it was only "consented" to under the coercion and duress of your vexatious litigation against your shareholders for raising the major integrity concerns/issues you failed as fiduciaries to resolve, in complete violation of the Mallinckrodt Plc. Guide to Business Conduct anti-retaliation policy and your ever-existing fiduciary duties to the entire capital structure under Irish law.

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Since the July 7, 2021, letter, we have also become aware of additional violations and obstructions of the Act by this Board and Company, which BHG also wishes to put you on firm notice of:

1. This Board has obstructed the provision of the Act, § 179 (providing that members/shareholders of this Company have the absolute right to apply to the Irish High Court for a court-ordered extraordinary general meeting), expressly due to their ongoing oppression of this entire shareholder base's rights under the Act, in direct relation to your congruent violation of the Act, § 212, whereby you impede on the ability of every shareholder to apply with the High Court of Ireland for relief of their illegal oppression. It is a legal right of this shareholder base under Irish law (the Act, § 179) that they are able to freely apply with the High Court of Ireland for relief of oppression, and you have - without question - interfered with their ability to freely exercise that right (absolute oppression of that right).

2. Obstruction of the Act, § 178 (requiring directors to convene an extraordinary general meeting upon the requisition of a proper quorum of members/shareholders, which is 5% of members in the case of a Traded PLC, with reliance on the Act, §§ 1099 and 1101, since the Company is, again, traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange under ticker "MCD"), provided the provision of the Act, § 178(2), which explicitly provides that individual Irish companies have no right to override that statutory right of Company members/shareholders under the Act, § 178, and that the Act, § 178, remains a right of Company members/shareholders, even if not included in a Company's constitution. You have entirely obstructed the Act, § 178, when that § 178(2) explicitly states you are one hundred percent prohibited from doing so. The Act, § 680 (requiring a liquidator convene general meetings of the members/shareholders continue uninterrupted and at least once per year throughout those liquidation proceedings), directly supports our argument that insolvency proceedings are a time during which shareholders/members unrestrictedly retain their innate rights under the Act (to ensure to that value is incentivized to flow as high up the capital structure as possible throughout such insolvency proceedings) and that member/shareholder meetings must continue as normal, without interruption, giving no right to directors, liquidators, examiners, etc. that they may interfere with member/shareholder meetings and/or obstruct shareholder rights (in violation of the Act, § 212). In fact, the Act, § 680, not only requires shareholder meetings to be held throughout insolvency proceedings, but requires them to be, minimally, held even closer together. During the normal course of business (outside of an insolvency liquidation setting), under the Act, § 175, meetings are to be held no further than 15 months apart, while the Act, § 680, requires them to be held no further than 12 months apart, actually statutorily enhancing shareholder rights during insolvency. The Act, § 680, is absolute proof that shareholder rights are ongoing at all times, even throughout insolvency, until a Company's shares are struck from the record and a Company no longer legally exists. Nowhere in the Act does a provision provide a Company to interfere with member/shareholder rights, § 212 exactly prohibits that, and § 680 directly supports our position. Examinership proceedings also include meetings of the members/shareholders, which you already conceded to including in your Chapter 11 disclosure statement, for which also directly supports our position that, even in a time where a Company believes it is insolvent, member/shareholder meetings still continue normally throughout such insolvency proceedings, members/shareholders do not lose their voice/rights even upon the Irish High Court agreeing a company is insolvent (through the Company being admitted into the examinership or liquidation process), nor are directors allowed to oppress the rights/voice of their members/shareholders which have so entrusted them as fiduciaries not to obstruct any provisions of the Act, including § 212.

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3. In violation of the Act, § 1100 (prohibiting anything but equal treatment of members/shareholders of a "traded PLC"), this Board has prejudicially treated BHG (and put their sights on any shareholder/member acting in "concert", so therefore automatically the entire 13-D group, which BHG had included various shareholders within to indicate broad shareholder base demand for an extraordinary general meeting to be called) since its lawsuit against BHG, also in complete violation of the Company's Guide to Business Conduct, wholly prohibiting retaliation against those raising integrity concerns/issues to the Board. Further, this Board is broadly prejudicing their entire member/shareholder base based on individual shareholder-by-shareholder actions, expressly indicating in the restraining order covering the entire shareholder base that any shareholder which does not support the Board, its initiatives, and wishes to exercise their shareholder rights under the Act in a way that does not support the present Board's initiatives, will be prejudicially retaliated against, all the way up to being possibly held in literal contempt of court. You, our Board, are clearly and maliciously using a foreign court for a vacation from Irish law, and as a means to prevent your constituency from reporting your numerous violations.

4. In relative relation to number 2 of this list (your obstruction of the Act, § 178), your absolute obstruction of the Act, § 1101, providing that members of a traded PLC (again, I think you need to get a grip on where your stock is listed, as it is traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange under ticker "MCD", which Germany has been a member state of the European Union since its founding) have the absolute right to call an extraordinary general meeting upon the requisition of members/shareholders representing 5% of such a company's outstanding common stock shares.

5. In obstruction of the Act, § 1104 (providing that shareholders/members have the absolute right to place items on the agenda of an annual general meeting of the members/shareholders), you have prohibited your shareholders from placing shareholder proposals on the agenda of the upcoming August 13, 2021, fatally rendering your annual general meeting invalid due to its violations of the Act. And if you want to try to make the claim that you are only prohibiting certain types of proposals from certain members/shareholders of the Company, then you are directly conceding to your violation of the Act, § 1100.

6. In obstruction of the Act, § 1106 (providing that members/shareholders have the absolute right to speak at an annual general meeting), you have muzzled your shareholders from freely speaking and bringing forth proposals to the floor, with your restraining order restricting the actions of your entire shareholder base, including restricting the speech of your shareholders/members in the way of verbally bringing proposals forth to the floor of the annual general meeting, in - again - complete violation of the Act, § 212.

7. In obstruction of the Act, § 1107 (the right of shareholders/members to freely speak and ask questions at a general meeting of the Company), your restraining order against shareholders directly interferes with the ability for members/shareholders to freely ask questions at a general meeting, for fear of violating one of the intentionally vague prohibitions of the restraining order. And again, if you attempt to claim that you are only restricting the actions of BHG and the 13-D group (those acting in "concert"), then you are prejudicially treating BHG and the 13-D group, and therefore expressly conceding to violation of the Act, § 1100.

8. In obstruction of the Act, § 1109 (providing the shareholders the absolute right to vote by correspondence), you have delivered shareholders/members ballots, which you will then claim allows your shareholders to vote, but - like your attempt to maintain a false front of compliance with the Act, § 175 (where you are attempting to run a completely invalid, tampered annual general meeting because you know you are required to no further than 15 months from the last general meeting), you provided us a ballot, but then have an active restraining order prohibiting us from voting the ballot as we wish, making the ballot (and, therefore, this entire "election") an absolute hoax. You give us a ballot, then tell us in the restraining order that we are prohibited from voting as we wish against directors, which is then an absolute falsehood then that we are able to vote by correspondence - plain and simple. We are also not even allowed to freely vote in person without violating the conditions of your restraining order (again, "any action seeking to remove … any directors or officers of any Debtor", which that would certainly qualify), so it goes far beyond the violation of not being able to vote by correspondence. You also have delivered an entirely invalid ballot, given that it is missing shareholder proposals that you are fully aware your shareholder base wished to bring forth (specifically, dismissing all directors for cause), yet you made those proposals illegal to submit, along with the director nominations that you are fully aware your shareholder base wished to submit, in complete violation of the Act, § 212, and our corporate charter. How fascinating…

9. In violation of the Act, § 1110, the Company is required to give shareholders a "full" account of the results of a vote. How can you say that the "results" of your absolutely manufactured "election" are the "full" account of votes, when you effectively scavenged the ballot box and tossed out the ballots of dissident shareholders through your prohibition of them even being cast? How can you also say that those are the "full" results when you have essentially left off, and not allowed for voting on, director nominations that you fully precluded from even being submitted, in complete violation of our corporate charter? You, essentially, also threw out the ballots that included votes for any directors that were not presently on the Board. What an absolute mockery of Irish law - I do not think they will find any humor in such perversion.

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10. Further, as part of the Act, § 1110, you are one hundred percent required as a Company to facilitate the exercise of shareholder rights by financial intermediaries (for which, BHG unquestionably qualifies as a registered investment advisory firm). How can you say you are facilitating the exercise of shareholder rights through intermediaries, as required under the Act, when you have - in fact - precluded those basic actions of exercising those rights to begin with, with your restraining order against this entire shareholder base? Good luck explaining that one. You are violating that statute (yet another one), by attempting to preclude BHG, as a financial institution/intermediary, from facilitating the exercising of shareholder rights at the instruction of its clients, with your restraining order already in violation of the Act, § 212. As illegal as it is for you to have instituted your injunctive order, given the Act, § 212, BHG is not advising clients how to vote their shares, but - given that we have been delivered a ballot - we are entirely required to contact clients to inform them that we have received a voting ballot that represents the voting power of their shares in the overall share count available for voting exercise on our master ballot for the entire firm of BHG, for which we are - again - legally, yet illegally, precluded from advising on how to vote, are legally required to tell them that they are technically precluded from voting, but if the client of BHG instructs us to still vote their shares a certain way, BHG is legally required to follow our clients' instructions, without deviation - that is not a choice on our end, and an absolute fiduciary duty. BHG (and I, as a representative of the firm) has absolutely no control over whether a client votes their shares, how clients of the firm vote their shares of the Company, and if a client instructs BHG that they wish to vote their shares with instructions as to how they wish those votes to be cast (given, BHG cannot express an opinion on voting options), BHG - as a fiduciary - must heed to the client's instructions and wishes. It is an absolute duty of BHG to follow the orders/instructions of clients. If this Company and Board is of the position that BHG should act in absolute deviation of the instructions received by its clients, you are directly asking BHG to break its fiduciary duty as much as you all have, and - that - I refuse to do. BHG is not taking any risk of losing our operating standing because you wish to evade the laws of your country of incorporation, your own fiduciary duties, oppress/coerce your shareholders, and otherwise - that is your problem. I can tell you that certain clients have already stated they will not be voting their shares, in fear of further retaliation by this Board, further supporting the absolute illegitimacy of this "election", which I have no doubt will be nullified due to the irrefutable coercion of this entire shareholder base, not to mention the equally irrefutable previous and active violations of the Act, § 212 (not to mention the numerous other statutes), with regards to unrestricted voting, obstruction of this shareholder base's absolute right under Irish law (and this Company's constitution) to submit director nominations, and this shareholder base's absolute right under Irish law (and this Company's constitution) to submit shareholder proposals. I will conclude this numbered item with, verbatim from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's circular on an investment advisor's fiduciary duty and responsibility related to voting authority of client security interests (link in footnote), "an investment adviser [should] form a reasonable belief that its voting determinations are in the best interest of the client, it should conduct an investigation reasonably designed to ensure that the voting determination is not based on materially inaccurate or incomplete information." ¹ BHG has conducted our investigation of the Board's approved and submitted proxy statement materials and has very easily concluded that you not only have deceived your shareholder base, but outright lied in that disclosure filing (such as, the Board-approved statement that director nominations were being considered). Upon this investigation conclusion, BHG also (per the precise obligations in that cited circular) responsibly informed the Board, Broadridge, and Ireland's Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, on July 7, 2021, of the numerous alarming deficiencies of disclosure within the proxy statement distributed alongside these "election" ballots, the absolute lies in that proxy statement (again, such as that director nominations were being considered), and - above all - this Board never mentioning/disclosing once the restraining order that bars your shareholder base from participating in this "election" (participation that is this shareholder/member base's absolute right under the Act) and how your restraining order oppressing/stripping your member/shareholder base's rights fatally tampered and manufactured the results of this "election" before it even started. BHG has received numerous calls from shareholders confused about this "election" and their rights, given the restraining order and its entirely fatal effects. No one knows what they can and cannot do anymore, which is our very firm basis for belief that the High Court of Ireland will nullify this "election" (and, hopefully, grant our request for your disqualification, given such illegal and immoral behavior that absolutely illustrates the ethical standards of this Board and their "wish" to uphold Irish law).

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¹ See Fiduciary Interpretation, 84 FR 33669, at 33674 (also, page 4: https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5325.pdf). See also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Release No. IA-2106 (Jan. 31, 2003), 68 FR 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) ("Proxy Voting Release"), at 6586 (explaining that an adviser's duty of care with respect to proxy voting requires, among other things, an adviser with proxy voting authority to monitor corporate events.)

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Before closing, I will also put on the record with this letter that, without prejudice, BHG is not going to file an objection to confirmation of your plan, as it is clear the U.S. court wishes to push through this plan, despite its numerous illegalities and inequities under Irish law. You can consider the content of BHG's letters, our very firm, unresolved grounds of objection to the plan. A "scheme of arrangement" illegally derived and the result of coercion, is automatically precluded from approval/sanctioning, as firmly held in the Irish High Court case of In Re Colonia Insurance Ireland Ltd. [2005]. Even if your valuation opinion as part of your "scheme" was correct (which you have no factual proof of), your plan is absolutely invalid on even just the single basis that StrataGraft®, which undoubtedly added material value to the asset side of the balance sheet of this company would - in a liquidation - cause stakeholders receiving partial to no recovery, to receive an enhanced recovery than initially proposed (given, that this plan is based on the pre-StrataGraft® financial conditions of this Company). In a liquidation, that extra value from StrataGraft® would have flowed further up the capital structure than when you began the liquidation, when your plan does not reflect that added value. You also just secured more revenue from that drug than you disclosed losing due to the decision on the CMS/Acthar issue, so you do not have any grounds for "hopeless insolvency" due to revenue loss either. Further, you already admitted that those set to receive equity are "over-secured" at the expense of other stakeholders receiving partial or no recovery, which nullifies your plan yet again, admitting that stakeholders would fare better under an actually equitable plan. You cannot simply toss someone extra value and then tell the other person whose expense that extra was given, "sucks to be you". If you actually held proper valuations and auctions for assets/equity, you would know what it is worth so that you would actually be giving the proper amount to every stakeholder, with no "over securing" at the expense of other stakeholders - you owe an equal an equal duty to all stakeholders. You also cannot take a number on a balance sheet, whack off an arbitrary amount of it (just enough to portray insolvency, and then a little extra), and say that is what the asset would garner in a liquidation - that is an utter joke and the exact reason Ireland set the precedent they did in Systems Services Building Group, Ltd. [2020], to prevent assets being dealt (whether through a reorganization or liquidation) at an undervalue, to absolutely prove out value, and to ensure that every stakeholder receives every penny possible for their investment in the company (whether bonds, stock, or otherwise). If this your best attempt at running a company, my god, none of you belong at any company. And even if you modify the amount of equity being allocated to the parties it is to try to nullify your impeaching "over secured" statement, you still have no proof that the new amount is even the correct amount because you do not even know what that equity is worth (cannot possibly, given no open market auctions to prove out value of even the balance sheet, as required by the previously cited case of Systems Services Building Group, Ltd. [2020]). You did not hold open market auctions for equity to prove your theory of "worthlessness" and assure maximum value distribution to shareholders, you did not hold an open market auction of assets to prove your ludicrous, unsupported valuation opinion placed on assets such as our unapproved drug pipeline… Your intent could not be painted on the wall any clearer with your actions, lack of care, and utter contempt toward those whom you are supposed to take utmost care of as part of your ever existing fiduciary duty. Also, let me take a guess: In the imminent 10-Q filing, you will mark down the assets a little more to try to prove out your "hopeless insolvency" song and dance (with no justification, as you tout how great the company is doing in your just-filed proxy statement, all of its wonderful drugs in the pipeline being made progress on, just after StrataGraft® is approved, and so many other wonderful things that far from justify any asset write-downs) - it is almost as if the next chapters of this story are already written.

As also stated at the end of the letter dated July 7, 2021, this letter (and the three letters previous to this) will be filed with the High Court of Ireland as evidence when the Company opens a case to attempt entering the Irish examinership process and/or approval of this Board's completely invalid and illegally derived "scheme of arrangement". Until then, we will allow you to enjoy the rest of your vacation from Irish law during these U.S. proceedings that you so wish to push through on and will abide by your restraining order against shareholders, but you are not going to, in your proxy statement, to Broadridge, the investing public, and the Government of Ireland, falsely portray and deceive that this is some certifiable, legitimate renewal of your directorships as part of an ongoing, uninterrupted, and legitimate democracy, as it is not. This whole situation is the biggest slap in the face to everyone at this table, and especially the Government of Ireland. Unless the High Court of Ireland throws out the entire Companies Act of 2014 (for as many statutes as you have absolutely violated and obstructed) and wishes to nullify the precedent of such ethical standards set by those High Court cases cited by BHG, your "scheme" is dead on arrival. Sanctioning this plan would result in setting an additional, unequivocal precedent that, if you are a big enough of a company, you are exempt from the Companies Act and - if shareholders are not aware of a board plotting against those it has a fiduciary duty to hijack the company from its stakeholders (not just shareholders) - they have the right to run off with it. Your further attempt to falsely portray (and put forth for certification) that this is some democratic process is entirely fictitious, dishonest, and reprehensible (we will let the Irish High Court determine if it - in its entirety - crosses into the realm of fraud). You, the Board, singlehandedly ended the democracy of this Company months ago, so do not mislead that such democracy still exists after your unequivocally fatal destruction of it and domineering transition to your present de facto oligarchic regime.

Page 11 of 12

Very Truly Yours,

Alexander Parker

Senior Managing Director

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.

Page 12 of 12

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.3 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

New York Headquarters		Mr. Alexander E. Parker
1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3		Senior Managing Director
New York, N.Y. 10036		E. alexander.parker@buxtonhelmsley.com
		T. +1 (212) 951-1530
		F. +1 (212) 641-4349

July 7, 2021

Broadridge, Inc.	Mr. Richard Daly, Executive Chairman
1155 Long Island Avenue	Mr. Chris Perry, President
Edgewood, N.Y. 11717	Mr. Tim Gokey, Chief Executive Officer


Board of Directors - All Members	Mr. Angus Russell, Chairman
Mallinckrodt Plc.	Mr. Mark Trudeau, Director
53 Frontage Road, Shelbourne Building	Mr. David Carlucci, Director
Hampton, N.J. 08827	Mr. J. Martin Carroll, Director
	Mr. Paul R. Carter, Director
	Mr. David Norton, Director
	Ms. Anne C. Whitaker, Director
	Ms. Joann Reed, Director
	Mr. Kneeland Youngblood, Director
	Mr. Carlos V. Paya, M.D., Ph. D., Director


Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement	Ms. Marian Lynch
16 Parnell Square	Ms. Xana McCarthy, Investigator
Dublin 1	Ms. Suzanne Gunne, Enforcement Lawyer
D01 W5C2, Ireland	Mr. Ian Drennan, Director of Corporate Enforcement

Re: Notice of Election Rigging by Directors and Management - Mallinckrodt Plc. (2021 Annual General Meeting)

Broadridge, and Ladies and Gentlemen of the Board:

This letter is primarily being addressed to Broadridge, due to their retention as the trusted inspector of elections for the Mallinckrodt Plc. (the "Company") 2021 Annual General Meeting. This letter is also being sent to Ireland's Office of Director of Corporate Enforcement, to add to their continued, growing investigation case file on the Company. In short, I am absolutely appalled and revolted that you, the board of directors (the "Board") of this Company, would even attempt certification of this election, its proposals, and its possible results as anything even near certifiable or a fair and genuine democratic process initiated by this Board.

While I know you, the Board, are only holding this meeting because you know you are obliged to under the Companies Act of 2014 (the "Act"), § 175 (statutorily mandating annual general meetings be held no further than 15 months apart, with the scheduled August 13, 2021 shareholder meeting being exactly 15 months since the last), I very much doubt that you told Broadridge, at the time you engaged them to hold such an important title as inspector of elections, that you filed for and were granted an actual restraining order (yes, Broadridge, a formal restraining order issued by a court) to allow yourselves (fiduciaries of this Company) to hold all of your dissident shareholders (you lumped the entire dissident shareholder base under the enclosed injunction, as can be seen in the highlighted part of Exhibit A, § 6) in literal contempt of court if they attempt to displace/remove yourselves, submit shareholder proposals to nominate new directors, submit shareholder proposals to remove/dismiss any of you, submit any other matters to be acted on by shareholders, etc.

You, the Board, did not disclose to the court that, after you would attempt to block (and successfully blocked) your entire shareholder base from calling a shareholder meeting (directly your words, "to enjoin the shareholder meeting") because it would cause such "irreparable harm" (again, your words, not mine), that you would then turn around and attempt to hold such a tampered democratic election (much sarcasm) under such iniquitous pretenses and attempt to certify its results as legitimate, once you already made it illegal for your shareholders to displace directors (vote against them), nominate alternatives, etc., rigging the meeting and its election results before it even began. Never have I seen a case where a court has allowed a company to block a shareholder meeting, then allow them to run a rigged election (where shareholders are only legally allowed to vote for directors, and not against them, or otherwise be held in contempt of court) and allow them to falsely certify the election as legitimate re-election of directors. To say your scheme is a sham, is an understatement.

You think you have a certifiable election when you make it illegal for your entire dissenting shareholder base to displace you, with an ultimate possible consequence of having them thrown in jail (as a possible result of being held in contempt of court) if they do? You, our Board, obtained the enclosed/referenced injunctive order in a foreign court (a U.S. court, not versed in Irish law) because it was completely illegal in your country of incorporation (the Act, § 212 explicitly prohibits and deems minority shareholder oppression by the directors to be illegal, with no exception). In Re Colonia Insurance (Ireland) Ltd [2005] 1 IR 497, the High Court of Ireland also explicitly prohibits coercion of stakeholders as part of the origination of and bringing forth a "scheme of arrangement" for potential sanctioning by the High Court of Ireland, making any element of coercion a criterion for immediate disqualification of any such proposed "scheme", yet you continue to spend millions per month on a reorganization attempt you know is already entirely invalid, and then attempt what would be an entirely invalid election to renew your directorships as well... You coerced far beyond The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. (hereinafter, "BHG") with your injunctive order, so do not make another desperate claim that your injunctive order was to stop only BHG's actions to "frustrate" your reorganization process that is fraught with violations of Irish law. The fact that you settled on the injunction shows that your claims against BHG were a mere façade of your actual intentions/motives with your "adversary" suit initiated to restrain your entire shareholder base (far beyond BHG). You used BHG as a scapegoat to put forth a hidden agenda. Your goal of coercing and literally restraining all opposing shareholders could not be clearer with your enclosed, purposely vague injunctive order, and especially when you see Section 6 of that injunctive order (again, included as Exhibit A). Your injunctive order against your dissident shareholders covers genuine, lawful acts by the directors, but BHG has the right to speak up about such a dishonest attempt by the Company, its directors, and management, to knowingly attempt the certification of such a completely rigged election. If you hold some sham of an election at this point, do not mislead people that it is some legitimate democratic process, as it is not.

Off the bat, given the restraining order included as Exhibit A, your proposed voting ballot is automatically invalid, since you precluded your shareholders (far beyond just BHG) from including absolutely any proposals (from Exhibit A, § 1(c), prohibiting proposition of "any matters to be acted upon by Mallinckrodt shareholders"). The ballot is completely invalid and uncertifiable, from the start. Then, if you took a vote of the shareholders on the proposals that you did include, it is then further without question that your voting results are (again) uncertifiable, given you have led shareholders to now believe it is illegal to vote against you through your injunctive order coercing your constituency (Exhibit A, § 1(e), prohibiting "any action seeking to remove, replace, nominate, appoint, elect or interfere with the election of any directors or officers of any Debtor"), threatening to ultimately, possibly send any violating shareholders to - again - the actual "clink" (a possible consequence of someone being held in contempt of court). You have incurably influenced your election through irreversible coercion to ensure you retain your positions and have entirely disrupted the democratic processes as such. To represent your attempted "democratic process" of an election now as genuine is absolutely, entirely fallacious. Your influence and coercion is entirely fatal to the legitimacy of any election. As I identify in my last letter to the Board, while you characterized your injunctive order as a "consent" order, "consent" under coercion is not "consent" (again, refer to my example of a streetside robbery) - you are the misleading ones when you represent "consent" under duress as such. Beyond that "consent" issue, you lumped the entire shareholder base under the injunction, yet no other shareholders "consented" to the injunction, yet you have filed with a court that all dissident shareholders (acting in "concert") are covered under the injunction, and so that is now what your shareholders believe (that is, those who even know about the injunction, as shareholders were not properly served a copy of it). It is now too late to make any modification of the order or to attempt clarity, as you have already endlessly confused, frightened, and mislead your shareholder base. You do not think that your shareholders now believe that if they were to somehow vote you out, that you would not initiate litigation against those "adversaries" (how you classified BHG in your "adversary complaint") that voted against you?

Page 2 of 5

I will add, if BHG's established 13D group, and those who are like-minded, but not a part of that official group (yet, acting in "concert", so therefore governed under the enclosed injunctive order), were able to put forth clearer resolutions to be acted upon (given, that the shareholder base of the Company, now an OTC security, is not institutional dominantly, and therefore less sophisticated), you undeniably could get a completely different result. You also could undeniably get a completely different result if those shareholders in BHG's established 13D group, and those who are like-minded, but not a part of that official group (yet, acting in "concert", so therefore governed under the enclosed injunctive order) were not precluded from including a proposal to not only dismiss directors one-by-one, but all directors for cause with immediate replacement as of the time of the shareholder meeting (as BHG originally intended). You have purposely altered/precluded resolutions from being brought forth, and therefore have restricted the voice of your shareholders to undeniably limit the possible results of your "election" in your favor (the fact that shareholders could not submit a proposal to dismiss all directors for cause is proof).

You are in no position to hold absolutely any certified election at all, given your coercion of those whom you have a fiduciary duty to, and active restraining orders against them to ensure you remain in your positions. Even if you lift that injunctive order today, your annual general meeting is invalid, given your restraining order prohibited your entire constituency from including numerous types of proposals, that could have provided clearer avenues to achieving the goals of this shareholder base (if, that is, we were able to voice ourselves, which we have been muzzled from doing). Even if you, our Board, removed the restraining order, and resubmitted a proposed ballot with shareholder proposals you previously precluded from being submitted by shareholders, you still have a completely uncertifiable election, given your already-committed coercion of your constituency, which there is no way to certify will not have skewed voting results thereafter as a result of the fear you have instilled into and the forceful manipulation of those you have a fiduciary duty to. While not being able to hold an annual general meeting will render you in complete violation of the Act, §175, that is no one's fault but your own. Your attempt to hold this annual general meeting with a vote of the shareholders is your further admission that you have no right to strip the rights and voice of your shareholders throughout this reorganization you are attempting, yet you already have with your injunctive order. Again, you have stripped the rights of shareholders far beyond BHG with your injunctive order, so do not claim for one second it was because of your absolutely desperate allegations against BHG for speaking up about your numerous violations of Irish law and our corporate governance rules, and BHG being forced to take matters into their own hands because this Board refused to speak with their shareholders (even before filing your Chapter 11 petition, BHG had communicated with the Board, and received no response). You, our Board, are attempting to enter an election cycle as if you are the leaders of China or North Korea, and I think if you ask the High Court of Ireland or the Office of Director of Corporate Enforcement in Ireland (again, who is already investigating you), you do not have the right to turn this company into such a virtual oligarchy.

Let me be clear that, while you cannot hold an annual general meeting because it would be completely invalid and uncertifiable at this point due to your already committed, incurable violations of Irish law, I am not telling you, the Board, to leave. In fact, BHG and its clients are of the position (now, that you have been so hostile with your shareholders) that we think it would be best you stay in place, as we believe you need to defend your actions before the High Court of Ireland as to what you have done in the United States behind Ireland's back. BHG refuses to make any attempt to displace you (including, voting against directors) before you get your chance to face the "music" that you "composed" at your own free will with your endless, and growing, violations of law and your fiduciary duties. As much as we know the injunctive order in place against shareholders is illegal under the Act, § 212 (prohibiting the oppression of minority shareholder interests/rights, with no exception), we are going to respect the order and abide by it by not voting you out. You have, however, coerced BHG into not speaking with other shareholders (it would be too risky, given the injunction) to inform them that they are not legally allowed to vote against directors, so you kind of shot yourself in the foot there (a way BHG could have helped you stay in place, actually).

Page 3 of 5

BHG sees no other possible option but for the Company to file a motion with the U.S. District of Delaware Bankruptcy Court, to give it some excuse to further flout Irish law (now, the Act, § 175, though there is no exemption/exception, just like the Act's § 212, prohibiting minority shareholder oppression), but we simply cannot rest silent without speaking up (though, after this letter, we have said all that we need to for the remainder of this Chapter 11 case) about this Company's attempt to certify the authenticity of a knowingly deceptive/untrue election, as though its results (and, from the start, its ballot) were not intimately interfered with and manipulated as a result of the Company's already previous flouting of the Act, § 212, and that any results would be certifiable as some genuine, freely democratic process initiated by this Board. It is legally impossible to maintain compliance with the Act, § 175 (requiring democratic annual meetings/elections being held no further than 15 months apart, with no exception), when you already have such incurable violations of the Act, § 212 (explicitly prohibiting the oppression of minority shareholder interests/rights, with no exception). The only reason any of your claims in your "adversary complaint" against BHG even exist, are because of your defiance to merely even speak with your shareholder base, whom you never lose your fiduciary duty to (see Systems Building Services Group Limited [2020], where the High Court of Ireland ruled that directors' fiduciary duties to all stakeholders in the capital structure survive even absolute insolvency).

As a few critical points for the Board (and Broadridge) to be aware of as great issue within your proxy statement filing on Friday, July 2, 2021 (the "Proxy Filing"):

1. You, the Board, admitted guilt in violating our ongoing equity retention requirements, by stating in the Proxy Filing that "on November 3, 2020, the Board of Directors waived compliance with the stock ownership guidelines for the duration of the Chapter 11 Cases." First, you misrepresent those corporate governance rules cited in that sentence from the proxy statement you just filed as a "guideline", when they are not a guideline, but a firm "requirement" in the compensation plan rules you agreed to adhere to. You affirm they are a requirement in the previous sentence, yet you use "guideline" in the next sentence. Those two words are far from the same, and completely contradictory (with completely different meanings), in an attempt to further cover up your mess. You want to talk about an inaccurate and misleading proxy statement? You also do not disclose that not one director or officer was compliant with those ongoing equity retention "requirements" as of the time of Chapter 11 filing (October 12, 2020, which is nearly a month before you "waived" your obligations), and far before that for nearly all of you. You did all the work in proving that violation yourselves, with an explicit, textual admission. Just when I do not think you could dig your hole deeper, you do it yet again. Shareholders would, further, likely think quite differently of you if they had the whole story, that not one of you were in compliance with those "requirements" well before you "waived" them for your personal convenience (very few non-institutional investors know what a Form 4 is, let alone how to read one, and you all are preying on that).

2. You do not disclose in the Proxy Filing that numerous types of shareholder proposals were precluded from being included as a result of the injunctive order against your entire dissident shareholder base (you made it clear you would have served any shareholder with that order if they attempted to include a proposal, such as dismissing all directors for cause, to replace them at the shareholder meeting, with your reliance on Exhibit A, § 6). You, further, do not even disclose the injunctive order itself, that it even exists, and its possible effects on the outcome of any election being had.

3. You state on page 23 of the Proxy Filing that "as provided in its charter, the Governance and Compliance Committee will consider nominations submitted by shareholders". Are you joking? You made it very clear you would not be accepting any proposals of nominations by any shareholder in the injunctive order (see Exhibit A, § 1(e), prohibiting "any action seeking to remove, replace, nominate, appoint, elect or interfere with the election of any directors or officers of any Debtor"), and would (with your injunctive order) hold shareholders in actual contempt of court if they submit nominations. You, therefore, admit guilt in breaching our corporate charter.

4. On page 26 of the Proxy Filing, you state that "the Mallinckrodt Guide to Business Conduct prohibits any employee from retaliating against anyone for raising or helping to resolve an integrity question". Again, are you joking? You literally sued BHG for raising integrity questions, that you not only did not resolve, but refused to (and still refuse) to answer. Not only did you sue BHG, but you labeled us an "adversary" for raising such issues/questions, when you are our elected fiduciaries that are legally obligated to report to us. You do not disclose in the Proxy Filing that you breached your "Guide to Business Conduct" by suing those raising integrity questions. Now, we are raising a major concern of integrity of this election (the ultimate pillar of the integrity of a democracy), yet - let me guess - you will retaliate again, in total violation of the "Guide to Business Conduct" you cited in the proxy statement? I am not voting against your directors because I am not allowed to (no matter how illegal it is to bar me from doing so, under Irish law), but I can speak up that this election cannot be falsely certified as legitimate, as it is not.

Page 4 of 5

5. On page 66 of the Proxy Filing, the Company states that "we are not aware of any reason why any of the nominees will not be able to serve if elected". Do I need to ask, again, are you joking? Perhaps, they will not be able to serve, because you are attempting to run an inherently rigged, and therefore invalid, election. Further, maybe they will not be able to serve because they will be disqualified as a result of oppressing their entire minority shareholder base in complete violation of the Act, § 212 (prohibiting "powers of the directors … being exercised in a manner oppressive to … any of the members)? And there are numerous other reasons. But, guess what… you do not disclose them.

This letter will be filed with the High Court of Ireland as evidence when the company opens a case there to attempt entering the Irish examinership process and/or approval of their completely invalid and illegal "scheme of arrangement".

Very Truly Yours,

Alexander Parker

Senior Managing Director

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.

Page 5 of 5

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.4 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

New York Headquarters		Mr. Alexander E. Parker
1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3		Senior Managing Director
New York, N.Y. 10036		E. alexander.parker@buxtonhelmsley.com
		T. +1 (212) 951-1530
		F. +1 (212) 951-1530

VIA REGISTERED U.S. POSTAL MAIL AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
mark.casey@mnk.com; board.directors@mnk.com; info@odce.ie; marian_lynch@odce.ie; xana_mccarthy@odce.ie; suzanne_gunne@odce.ie;
ian_drennan@odce.ie;

June 1, 2021

Mr. Mark Casey, Chief Legal Officer	Mr. Angus Russell, Chairman
Board of Directors - All Members	Mr. Mark Trudeau, Director
Mallinckrodt Plc.	Mr. David Carlucci, Director
53 Frontage Road, Shelbourne Building	Mr. J. Martin Carroll, Director
Hampton, NJ 08827	Mr. Paul R. Carter, Director
	Mr. David Norton, Director
	Ms. Anne C. Whitaker, Director
	Ms. Joann Reed, Director
	Mr. Kneeland Youngblood, Director
	Mr. Carlos V. Paya, M.D., Ph. D., Director


Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement	Ms. Marian Lynch
16 Parnell Square	Ms. Xana McCarthy, Investigator
Dublin 1	Ms. Suzanne Gunne, Enforcement Lawyer
D01 W5C2, Ireland	Mr. Ian Drennan, Director of Corporate Enforcement

Re: Mallinckrodt Plc. Reorganization - Notice of Shareholder Oppression in Violation of Companies Act of 2014, § 212

Mr. Casey, and Ladies and Gentlemen of the Board:

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc. (the "Firm") is in receipt of your May 25, 2021 letter. That letter is enclosed herein, for reference by the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement, so it may be added to their growing case file on Mallinckrodt Plc. (the "Company"). On behalf of the Firm, we find it outrageous, your "disagreement" with no basis or explanation (beyond hollow). You have an obligation as a fiduciary to justify your actions to your stakeholders, even if you abhor them. When you have no explanation for your actions, you do all the work in proving your intentions are/were not honorable. Regarding your disagreement and parallel lack of explanation, we remind you of your obligations under the Companies Act of 2014 ("CA14"), for which the Company consented to and is duly bound as an entity incorporated in Ireland. It is not your prerogative to take the tax breaks and disregard the rest of the regulations you are not particularly fond of at the moment.

Let me also make something very, very clear. This Company chose, by its own free will and gumption, to incorporate in Ireland, with no external pressures/threats to do so. That is consent. With regards to my "consent" you referred to in your enclosed letter, it is not consent when I am threatened and coerced by the Company to "consent" to an illegal action being attempted on me by the Company. When you tell your stakeholders that you will drag out malicious, groundless litigation against them if they do not agree to "consent" to a specific, illegal action being attempted on them (through coercion), that is not "consent". Your framing of my "consent" could not be more misleading. When someone demands a man turn over his wallet in a street-side robbery, his "consenting" to turn over his wallet under coercion does not make the robbery legal because they "consented" to the crime. I was told not to be misleading or make false statements in my injunctive order, so let us not be hypocritical here. Just because you got an injunctive order (statutorily prohibited in your country of incorporation) through a foreign court that is clearly unaware of Irish law, in no way does that make the action legal. I will add that Buxton's clients and the rest of the shareholder base (for as broad as you wished to restrain/oppress your stakeholders through the wording of your injunctive order) did not in any way "consent". Your order was also in complete violation of the basic United States constitutional right to a fair trial and opportunity to defend one's actions - you cannot simply serve my legal order on another completely different individual/entity without them being given a fair trial (and formal notice of an injunctive order that they are to abide by). Your order was illegal in absolutely every aspect. This Company's ill-intentioned use of a foreign court to push through a "scheme" and legal orders that you know would not be allowed in your country of incorporation (and use of the automatic stay to prevent them from seeking intervention from Ireland) is very telling of this Company's intentions and ethical standards. Also, there was not one action said to be taken in my letter. I, in fact, explicitly said I would not take any action during United States proceedings, abiding by the injunctive order crammed down my throat, "consented" to after the Company's threats of what they would do if I did not essentially surrender.

This Board and management are on firm notice of their ongoing violation of CA14, § 212 (coercion/oppression of your stakeholders), in an attempt to perpetuate your prejudicial "scheme" (prejudicial to both shareholders and creditors, cherry-picking those you wish to pay out, with prejudice existing even in the bounds of same inherent classes of creditors). Your "scheme" will have had acceptance clearly "obtained by improper means" (CA14, § 543(1)(b)) once you get to the High Court of Ireland (already has crossed into that territory, incurably). This Board and management's current plans, and the process by which they are attempting to bring them forth as a proposed "scheme of arrangement", already violates four out of five of the criteria requirements set forth by Mr. Justice Kelly in Re Colonia Insurance (Ireland) Ltd [2005] 1 IR 497 (also recently referenced in Re Ballantyne Re plc. [2019], with one criterion disqualifying all plans resulting from stakeholder "coercion").

You have a completely unconfirmable plan, both in form and by process, and - again - you are on firm notice of it, continuing in full awareness.

Very Truly Yours,

Alexander Parker

Senior Managing Director
The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.

Page 2 of 2

The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.5 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

New York Headquarters		Mr. Alexander E. Parker
1185 Avenue of the Americas, Floor 3		Senior Managing Director
New York, N.Y. 10036		E. alexander.parker@buxtonhelmsley.com
		T. +1 (212) 951-1530
		F. +1 (212) 951-1530

VIA REGISTERED U.S. POSTAL MAIL AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
board.directors@mnk.com; info@odce.ie; marian_lynch@odce.ie; xana_mccarthy@odce.ie; suzanne_gunne@odce.ie;
ian_drennan@odce.ie;

May 20, 2021

Board of Directors - All Members	Mr. Angus Russell, Chairman
Mallinckrodt Plc.	Mr. Mark Trudeau, Director
675 McDonnell Blvd.	Mr. David Carlucci, Director
St. Louis, MO 63042	Mr. J. Martin Carroll, Director
United States of America	Mr. Paul R. Carter, Director
	Mr. David Norton, Director
	Mr. Carlos V. Paya, M.D., Ph. D., Director
	Ms. Joann Reed, Director
	Ms. Anne C. Whitaker, Director


Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement	Ms. Marian Lynch
Government of Ireland	Ms. Xana McCarthy, Investigator
16 Parnell Square	Ms. Suzanne Gunne, Enforcement Lawyer
Dublin 1	Mr. Ian Drennan, Director of Corporate Enforcement
D01 W5C2
Ireland

Re: Mallinckrodt Plc. Reorganization - Notice of Shareholder Oppression in Violation of Companies Act of 2014, § 212

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. ("Buxton") is a registered investment adviser. As you are aware through our last 13-D filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission"), Buxton and a group of like-minded investors retain a 5.6% interest in Mallinckrodt plc (the "Company").

The reason why this letter is being addressed to you all, the Board of Directors (the "Board"), is to further document your continued, willful (and now, with your injunctive restrictions that strip Buxton's shareholder rights, additional) violations of Irish law and breaches of fiduciary duty. If, somehow, you want to claim that you do not know what you are doing (and that it is both illegal and in breach of your duties), we are going to make everything crystal clear in this letter for you. This will also ensure that those insurers behind your director and officer liability policies will not pay out if you should later seek to obtain coverage from those policies - you have not an ounce of plausible deniability towards your actions after this letter. Even if you attempt to include a release of liability in your disclosure statement as part of the United States reorganization proceedings, such a release is not enforceable without sign off from the High Court of Ireland (with respect to Ireland-incorporated entities of the debtors), and there is also no such thing as a liability release from illegal acts. Lest you think it is just Buxton who has identified all your illegal acts and breaches of duty, might I remind you to refer to the laundry list of (recently filed) objections to your initial proposed disclosure statement, where Buxton even so much agreed with even creditors' opinions of your acts that we objected in the form of a joinder to theirs. You can also refer to other items such as docket number 2234 (one of numerous examples), where even creditors are advocating for (as a result of such apparent gross breaches to) equity holders, when they have no economic incentive nor obligation to. All of your stakeholders are looking out for each other, and we clearly do not say the same about the Board's upholding of their (intended to be) disinterested duties to us. You have had endless chances to avoid personal claims/suits and have only dug your hole of personal liability exposure deeper and deeper, voluntarily:

Buxton mailed a letter to the Board on September 28, 2020 (enclosed after this letter), after feeling compelled to do so, given your September 8, 2020 8-K filing with the Commission, just weeks before Chapter 11 petition filing, wherein you disclosed "bonuses" to top executives, suspiciously linked to events related to a supposed and vaguely defined upcoming Chapter 11 filing (its ultimate proposed terms, unknown to Company stakeholders, at that time). After receipt of that letter, you could have reached out to Buxton and communicated with your stakeholders, to ensure that they were in agreeance with your contemplated actions, yet you did not. I will also add, at no time did the Company disclose that there were any Chapter 11 plans, alternative to the surgical Chapter 11 filing (also known as "project Balboa", whereby select subsidiaries would have been bankrupted, and not the parent company, Mallinckrodt Plc.), to be executed prior to conclusion and announcement of the Acthar-related appeal decision (for which you spent countless millions of stakeholder money on in legal fees, as you vehemently denied liability in the matter).
After filing of your Chapter 11 plans with the United States District of Delaware Bankruptcy Court (the "Bankruptcy Court"), which came as a complete shock to every stakeholder who was not given such preferential treatment in the negotiations (that includes shareholders and even certain creditors), Buxton then filed a Motion for Appointment of an Equity Committee with the Bankruptcy Court. While Buxton was the first shareholder to file a Motion for Appointment of an Equity Committee, numerous other shareholders followed suit. Soon after, an official ad hoc group of equity holders formed, which engaged counsel that appeared during the hearings on appointment of an equity committee. At this time, the Company (and, therefore, by no opposition, the Board) filed an Objection to the Appointment of an Equity Committee, further illustrating their wish to continue in complete disregard to the interests of their shareholders they have a fiduciary duty to.
After the equity committee was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, given the Company's completely speculative extrapolation of "liabilities" into the "trillions" (mind you, just months before, you were stating you believed you had no actual liability at all in the matters), and "worthlessness" of numerous assets (and equity) without any open market auctions to prove such stark statements (also in defiance of Irish law, which I will get into soon), Buxton began its public campaign to engage the attention of the Board and Company management. Throughout three press releases, beginning January 15, 2021, Buxton aired out numerous violations of corporate governance rules and noting the endless breaches of fiduciary duty. Since then, we have now linked the actions of this Board (clearly, given your silence, condoning actions of this Company) to cases of Irish High Court rulings where directors were disqualified/restricted from directorship and assumed personal liability for the same actions as yours, such as not holding open market auctions to prove out value of assets before self-dealing them to an entity for which post-reorganization insiders will receive an equity allocation of (see mid-2020 Irish High Court ruling in the case of Systems Building Services Group Limited). Despite these three press releases by Buxton, over the course of approximately three months, the Board and Company remained silent as Buxton engaged with a sizable number of shareholders to form a 13-D group (to be explained in next item). During this span of time at which the press releases were being distributed, the Company (and Board) never made one public statement (clearly not able to refute even one of the violations stated within the press releases). The Board also never reached out to Buxton to understand how they could prevent personal claims because of their numerous corporate governance violations and breaches of duty.
On March 5, 2021, Buxton gathered the data sufficient to form an official shareholder group and allow for the filing of a Schedule 13-D with the Commission, for which Buxton noted an extremely broad "purpose of transaction" within the filing, simply to alert the Company that we had garnered enough of an official constituency to call an Extraordinary General Meeting under Section 178, 1099, and 1101 of the Companies Act of 2014 (the "Act"). That said, we did not make any firm requests/demands for engagement, as we wished to allow for the Board to make a responsible decision to engage the shareholders to whom they have a fiduciary duty to. The "purpose of transaction" was very polite:

"The Reporting Persons reserve the right, consistent with applicable law, to (i) acquire additional Shares and/or other equity, debt, notes, instruments or other securities (collectively, "Securities") of the Issuer (or its affiliates) in the open market or otherwise; (ii) dispose of any or all of their Securities in the open market or otherwise; and (iii) engage in any hedging or similar transactions with respect to the Securities. The Reporting Persons may engage in discussions with management or the Board of Directors of the Issuer concerning the business, operations, management, and future plans of the Issuer. Depending on various factors, including the Reporting Persons' financial position and investment strategy, the price of the Shares, conditions in the securities markets, and general economic and industry conditions, the Reporting Persons may in the future take such actions they deem appropriate, including, without limitation, seeking Board representation, submitting shareholder proposals, calling for a special shareholder meeting, or calling for changes in the board of directors or management of the Issuer."

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By March 10, 2021 (five days after the initial 13-D filing), Buxton had not heard from management or the Board to even attempt to understand any claims of breach of duty or attempt to suppress any possible action as a result of corporate governance violations listed within the press releases of Buxton. Given no engagement by the Board absent a formal request, Buxton demanded a telephonic conference with the Board of the Company (via an amended 13-D filing with the Commission on March 10, 2021) to be held before March 12, 2021 at 4:00pm New York Time. Buxton then waited, yet again, for the Board to reach out, as was their duty to report to their stakeholders, at all times, as Directors and fiduciaries of the Company.
On March 12, 2021 (at approximately 8:00pm New York Time, just hours after lapse of the deadline set by Buxton for a telephonic conference call with the Board), Buxton received an e-mail from Company Chief Legal Officer, Mr. Mark Casey, in which Mr. Casey notified Buxton that the Company had filed a lawsuit (in the form of an "adversary complaint") in the Bankruptcy Court, attempting to strip Buxton of its rights to call an Extraordinary General Meeting under Section 178, 1099, and 1101 of the Act. You, the Board, did/allowed this in complete disregard to Section 212 of the Act, which absolutely prohibits shareholder oppression, for which there could not be a more severe form of oppression than a formal gag order. You, our Board, singlehandedly, turned this Company from a democracy into a self-imposed oligarchy, for which you are now at the helm as an illegal, self-imposed regime, to prevent your constituency from regaining control to cease and reverse harm because of your many illegal doings and capricious plans in complete disregard to those whom you have a fiduciary duty to. There is not one exemption listed in Section 212 of the Act, and the very point of that statute is to prevent or cease the harms of this very situation shareholders (and unlawfully impaired bondholders) are experiencing now - a rogue board of directors (and underlying management). The Board, at that point, had not only completely ignored the requests of those whom it had/has a fiduciary duty to, to merely speak with them, but then further attempted to strip those stakeholders of their rights under Irish law to replace directors, given the Board's (and, by allowance of the Board, our management's) clear, complete neglect and disregard to the interests of so many parts of the capital structure.

Directly from the Companies Act of 2014, § 212:

212. (1) Any member of a company who complains that the affairs of the company are being conducted or that the powers of the directors of the company are being exercised-

(a) in a manner oppressive to him or her or any of the members (including himself or herself), or

(b) in disregard of his or her or their interests as members,

May apply to the court for an order under this section.

Let me ask you: Do you think that your stripping Buxton and the entire 13-D group of its rights to call an Extraordinary General Meeting, submit shareholder proposals, etc., are "the powers of the directors of the Company being exercised in a manner oppressive to … the members"? How much do you think you are regarding your members' interests when you force a muzzle on them? I think you can conclude the same answer as the High Court of Ireland will.

You are now also aware, through this letter, that the "scheme of arrangement" you are attempting to put forth in the High Court of Ireland will have then been "obtained by improper means" (Companies Act of 2014, § 543(1)(b)), given your known ongoing violation of Section 212 of the Act, among others, as you continue soliciting acceptance of your proposed "scheme of arrangement" by other interested parties, in the midst of complete prejudice to and illegal oppression of shareholders (also in violation of Companies Act of 2014, § 541(4)(b)). You, again, have not an ounce of plausible deniability, after this letter, as to your acts in complete defiance of Irish law. I will also add that the High Court of Ireland will almost surely agree that this Board should be personally on the hook for any monetary damages to Buxton (and this entire shareholder base, for as broad as your injunctive order was attempted to be) as a result of the Section 212 violations that this Board has clearly condoned (continuing to sit through, in silence).

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A Board typically would have an irrefutably sound rationale that there is no logical reason/standing to replace them, since a Board typically has a demonstrated interest aligned with equity holders (because they are equity holders themselves). And you would have been able to rely on that sound rationale; that is, if you had been in compliance with our compensation plan rules surrounding ongoing equity retention requirements. You, our Board, and our management, collectively own less than 0.03% of the Company at present. That very clearly demonstrates you could not have been (and could not be) less aligned with the interests of your shareholders. Then, as if you are entitled to further depart from the interests of your shareholders, you sell off most every share of the paltry stock you did own, and wonder why we have sought better representation? And this is after you "pillaged the pot" of hard assets (cash) for yourselves prior to declaring it "short" to equity holders and everyone else at the table... Your clear benefit at this point would be maximizing post-reorganization equity value, in hopes that you will get a slice of it as part of the post-reorganization insider equity pool/allocation. That is the exact reason you do not belong in your positions - you are not aligned with our interests. You have a clear economic interest and benefit to default to equity being "worthlessness", just as you have, with no open market auction having been had to prove that hypothesis (surprise, surprise). But a recapitalization by a third-party bidder would have possibly meant that directors and certain executives may no longer be getting their paychecks, bonuses, and, if they are lucky enough to remain as post-reorganization insiders, an outsized post-reorganization equity allocation, if their positions are no longer required. You did not want to test your hypothesis of equity (and asset) value "worthlessness" (through an open market auction), where creditors might not be impaired at all, just because you might risk losing out on such a gravy train of benefits. You took the track that best assured your future and optimal assurance of such a lion's share of benefits, over the wellbeing of the stakeholders whom you have a fiduciary duty to. While post-reorganization position retention is not guaranteed, the route you have chosen is clearly your best chance of retaining your positions. You would not experience one ounce of an economic benefit from fighting our headwinds like a vested stakeholder would throughout these Chapter 11 proceedings, so why would you? You have only every interest to capriciously settle those claims and race through this Chapter 11 case to get to the hopeful gravy train. It will not harm you one bit. Very simply, if you had a demonstrated, aligned interest with shareholders, we would never seek to remove you, nor would we have logical standing to. Only because you have demonstrated the exact opposite of an aligned interest with your stakeholders, have we sought to remove you. First, you ignore the letters we sent you requesting a telephonic conference with the Board, then you sue us for requesting it, to strip us of our rights and turn this Company into a self-imposed oligarchy thereafter, in complete violation of Section 212 of the Act. When you disregard the interest of shareholders (and certain creditors), that is - again - called prejudicial treatment, which is - again (I do not know how many times I must repeat myself) - a violation of Section 541 of the Act, which statutorily would therefore preclude the implementation of your "scheme".

While Buxton had no apparent choice but to accept the muzzle (injunction) you forced upon minority shareholders as the Board of this company, given the bankruptcy court's priority to push through a reorganization attempt without regard to the violations of Irish law and sheer lack of ethics that are taking place as part of that reorganization, over holding a board and management accountable for such massive breaches of their fiduciary duty and violations of Irish law, this is far from the end of our pushback. While I will abide by my gag order (as illegal as it was for you to institute) not to call a shareholder meeting, conduct a proxy contest, or anything else you all have muzzled Buxton from doing during the U.S. reorganization proceedings, it is inherently part of the process of approving a scheme of arrangement in Ireland that Buxton will have the opportunity to air out all of your violations, breaches (of both duty and law), and prejudicial treatment of stakeholders (shareholders and creditors) during those hearings in Ireland. I will also note that we have had extensive communication with the Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement in Ireland, for which has been made imminently aware of your numerous, willful violations of Irish law. And after this letter, you will have further proven (to them, and the High Court of Ireland, during hearings on this "scheme") that it was your sheer intent to continue the illegal behavior (which, also would be grounds for possible disqualification/restriction as directors, under Section 819 of the Act). Your behavior has been not only irresponsible and immoral, but in violation of Irish law.

While you, the Board (ultimately responsible for the actions of the management of the Company for which you are responsible for overseeing), alleged violations of securities laws, you did so with an inability to cite a private cause of action for each:

For Section 13D of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), there is no private cause of action listed in that statute. You cannot create a private cause of action out of thin air if there is not one in the statute, plain and simple. Yet you allowed Company legal counsel to continue to harass and attempt to oppress (with malicious litigation) Buxton over allegations for which you had no private cause of action (and had absolutely no harm). Therefore, while I have no obligation to address your allegations (since they are explicitly between Buxton and the Commission, by virtue of no private cause of action related to Section 13D of the Exchange Act), I would like to tell you, the Board, that I did the best job I could to formalize a shareholder group due to how quickly you allowed this Company to turn south for nearly every stakeholder at the table (except those receiving preferential treatment, of course), as quick as I possibly could. Buxton was, effectively, herding cattle (shareholders), attempting to keep a constant track of every shareholder (some, I would lose contact with, as new ones would begin contacting me), as each of those shareholders was also constantly buying and selling shares. Buxton did the best job possible to keep track of all active shareholders, in formalizing a group, getting the necessary data from all 13-D group members to file, then getting approval from each member to file, etc. If you think you could have done the work better, then I guess you are better than I, but I do not know I would be proud of your perspective as part of such a criticism.

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For Section 14A of the Exchange Act, there is possible private cause of action, however, you must prove tangible, specific, involuntary monetary harms, as a result of the potential violations of the statute. Your legal counsel could not cite one monetary harm as a result of your alleged violations of Section 14A. When my legal counsel continued to ask you what your private cause of action was under Section 14A, you could not come up with an answer and merely kept pointing us to your complaint, for which there was no tangible, nonspeculative, involuntary harm listed as a result of your alleged violations. The only harm that was a result of the alleged Section 14A violations, was this Board and management's expending Company financial resources to fend off the stakeholders for whom you had and have a fiduciary duty to, with your "adversary" (very interesting, that you label those whom you have a fiduciary duty to as an "adversary") complaint/lawsuit against Buxton. We will note that the High Court of Ireland is empowered to issue any orders of relief (whether monetary or otherwise) they see fit to cease and reverse the harm as a result of oppression of stakeholders in violation of Section 212 of the Act. This Board and management inappropriately expended resources on oppressing the stakeholders whom they have a fiduciary duty to, in the complete adverse interest of those they are responsible for ensuring that they protect and regard the interests of. While the United States Bankruptcy Court may wish to enable your restructuring plans that are foundationally in complete violation of Irish law (and, therefore, unconfirmable, under §§ 543(1)(b) and 543(4)(b) of the Act, that does not exempt you from Irish law, for which you will be forced to face in Ireland. And, again, you are on full notice with this letter.

In summary, the difference between the Company and I, is that even if I may have possibly mis-stepped on accident, I correct course when I am informed of even possible missteps. You all, on the other hand, are informed over and over of your numerous, then willful missteps and illegal actions, and continue that course of illegal action. To date, you have not backed up one of your allegations against Buxton. You ask for support of everything I have publicly proclaimed of you all (violating our corporate governance rules, being "corrupt", "self-serving", perpetrating something "similar to the unfolding a Ponzi scheme", and otherwise), which I have provided, and you have not been able to refute. You claim my statements are misleading, merely because my opinions do not match your own and you do not like the facts. In fact, you asked the court to strike all factual statements of mine from the record during my 45-minute testimony of your endless violations of Irish law and fiduciary duty, for which I do not blame you for; that information was far from becoming of you all. You have not been able to debunk one factual statement of mine as being false. Even more notable, while you attempt to injunct me from making false statements, your legal counsel made false statements about matters as basic as whether or not the Company is listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange under ticker "MCD" (just after my citation of that fact, the Company's legal counsel followed with claiming that the Company is not traded on any regulated European Union member state securities exchange). If you want to confirm that fact of false statements by the Company, you can read the transcript of the hearing - I am not wasting my time to find it. And I am the misleading one?

Before I list the numerous other violations of the Companies Act of 2014: Since the Company questioned why (in the lawsuit against my firm), I am going to explain exactly why I compared the actions of our Board and management to the final days of Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme. On the eve of Madoff admitting to his sons that he was running the largest Ponzi scheme in the world, he - at the same time - told them that he was paying out millions upon millions in "bonuses" to his most important employees, and millions in returned investments to preferred investors, just prior to telling all his other investors that he had nothing left for them. With Mallinckrodt, just weeks before our Board and executives notified stakeholders at their table that there was no money left for them, and that the Company was supposedly insolvent, that same Board and executives paid out millions in cash "bonuses" to themselves. I, again, refute the legitimacy that claim of insolvency by executives, given their admission (during equity committee hearings) of marking assets to zero value consideration and having extrapolated "liabilities" into the "trillions", despite having just months before stated that they had no liability in our litigation headings. Sound familiar? What a parallel! And even worse, you claim you still do not have any money for those investors still holding an empty bag, yet you think it is ethical to take another ~$35 million in cash "bonuses" while you still show those investors (obviously, not your favorite ones) to their empty bag? And then, you have the audacity to then claim that you deserve to reorganize your "scheme", and award post-reorganization insiders a 10% equity allocation. This board and management's "pillaging of the pot" before declaring it "short" to stakeholders, could not be more of a stark parallel of Madoff's final days attempting to divvy up millions to his pals before pulling the rug out from under everyone else he had a fiduciary duty to. You distributed "bonuses" equivalent to 1.5x the annual salary of top executives (just weeks before Chapter 11 petition filing) to ensure ample personal financial resources throughout the restructuring process, so why - just months later - do they need multiples of those salaries, yet again, in another round of "bonuses", while those they have a fiduciary duty to are still without a penny? Was that in the best interests of lining the executives' pockets with millions more for of-the-moment crystal-cupped martinis, to open their pools for the summer, and other unnecessary, discretionary luxuries, or in the best interest of those whom you have a fiduciary duty to, many of whom you still are claiming you do not have a penny for? This last minute "pillaging of the pot", as you are readying to declare insolvency to everyone else at the table (and continuing such pillaging throughout "insolvency"), is illegal under Irish law (see Irish High Court case of Winning Ways Ltd., where insiders were held personally liable for their preferential payments). Not only immoral, but illegal.

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In terms of why I have accused you all of "capriciously settling litigation": When our legal woes you cite as a basis for "hopeless" insolvency, are only in the United States, and are not - by default (given, no bilateral treaty surrounding reciprocal legal judgment recognition between the United States and Ireland) - enforceable against any Irish entity, you have no basis to bankrupt the entire company or claim insolvency in entirety (proven by the Company's inability to defend why you are bankrupting the entire Company during the equity committee hearings).

In case you are not aware of the full laundry list of breaches of fiduciary duty, violations of corporate governance rules, and violations of Irish law (filing for reorganization in the U.S. does not exempt you from your country of incorporation's laws), I will remind you of them:

1. In violation of Section 212(1)(a) of the Act, prohibiting shareholder oppression, a restraining/injunction order against Buxton, to prevent Buxton and its associated shareholders (in the 13-D filing) from calling an Extraordinary General Meeting under Section 178, 1099 and 1101 of the Act, among other injunctive restrictions stripping those minority shareholders of their democratic rights.

2. In violation of Section 212(1)(b) of the Act, the same restraining/injunction order against Buxton (and its associated minority shareholders). Also, the Company's express statement (and your silence, after that statement is made) during equity committee hearings, that the Company conducted no open market auction of existing equity interests and many assets, defaulting to a value consideration of "worthlessness", with no proof and no regard to the interests of multiple classes of stakeholders in the capital structure being impaired, including shareholders.

3. In further violation of Section 212(1)(b) of the Act, your injunction prohibits Buxton (and any even possibly associated shareholders) from submitting shareholder proposals surrounding the nomination, reelection, or dismissal of directors at the upcoming August 13, 2021 Annual General Meeting, in complete disregard and oppression of our interests as minority shareholders and members of this Company. Shareholder proposals for the upcoming AGM are due in less than two days, yet your legal counsel has precluded us from submitting any shareholder proposals, in complete violation of Section 212 of the Act, and you, our Board, allows them to continue violating that statute. Interesting…

4. You, our Board (along with our officers), "pillaged the pot" before declaring it "short" to shareholders and creditors, taking extra hard assets (cash) from the Company, in lieu of equity grants, leading up to your declaration of supposed insolvency, because of the "uncertainty" (exact word from your compensation-related filings) at hand as a result of our litigation headwinds (i.e., you wondered if equity would be worth anything, so you thought you would take some hard assets for yourselves before you tell every other stakeholder that there is no money left for them). The Company had a "going concern" opinion at the time, making it even more illegal for you to do so; not only did you question the solvency of the Company, but so did our auditors. While I am sure you can conclude that is unethical on your own, you can - again - also refer to the Irish High Court ruling of Winning Ways Ltd. (where the directors assumed personal liability, as a result of such "pillaging the pot" by the directors and fiduciaries).

5. As I already mentioned before, not one executive officer or director was compliant with their ongoing equity retention requirements (a "requirement", and not a guideline) at the time of filing for Chapter 11 reorganization (and far, far before that), explaining why there were numerous routes of extremely basic strategic alternative resolutions being neglected. If you held the proper amount of stock at the time of Chapter 11 filing, you would be very receptive to possible ideas of preserving equity value, but you are not because your destruction of equity value with neglect to numerous paths of possible value preservation, does not harm you one bit. I can guarantee you can come up with some excuse for violating those requirements, but I can also guarantee that there is not one shareholder at the table who would not agree that any such excuse could not ring hollower. No matter the excuse, I can further guarantee you that your shareholders would oust you if they had the chance to, due to that violation alone. But we cannot, can we, due to your violation of Section 212 of the Act, too. It is all too easy to see the trend of violations here, only in the interests of protecting/benefiting our fiduciaries, is it not?

6. Not holding an open market auction for assets, which you are attempting to self-deal to an entity for which post-reorganization insiders will receive an equity allocation of. It makes no difference if the post-reorganization insiders are the same insiders as those at present - it is insiders dealing to insiders, plain and simple. That is a clear conflict of interest. Even if you gave consideration of hundreds of millions to those assets, until you hold an open market auction for those assets, as ruled to be required in the mid-2020 Irish High Court ruling of Systems Building Services Group Limited, that is not enough. You are required (yes, required) to hold an open market auction of those assets, for which you did not. I, for one, would make a starting bid of $10 for those assets, so your opinion of "worthlessness" is singlehandedly proven false, right there. And no one knows how high the bids would go. And that is the very reason why you are obliged to follow the law and hold open-market auctions for assets (and therefore, by inexplicable relativity, equity). Why do you not leave those "worthless" assets like the drug pipeline for existing shareholders, if they are so "worthless"? When you take something without paying for it, that is called "stealing". A white collar does not alleviate you from the label of such an act. But when that "worthless" asset group includes drugs like StrataGraft®, set to yield $250+ million per year (with only a site visit pending before approval of the drug, to our knowledge), I can see why you would want to convey such "worthless" assets to a reorganized entity that then-insiders will receive a 10% equity allocation of. How shockingly convenient…

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7. Extinguishing equity (claiming it is "worthless") with no bidding process having been had (again, refer to the Irish High Court case of Systems Building Services Group Limited). By inexplicable relativity to assets being ruled to be required to hold an open market auction for to prevent any possible consideration undervaluing as part of reorganization, you would inherently be required to also hold open market auctions for equity, given that a recapitalization of the Company by a third-party could possibly result in higher value consideration to existing stakeholders than any possible proposed reorganization plan. While assets could be understated, liabilities could, contrarily, be conveniently overstated (to deplete apparent equity, just as numerous stakeholders would agree was the attempt here) for the benefit of those set to receive equity, like post-reorganization insiders. That is why an open market auction for equity is inexplicably in the best interest of ensuring maximum value (and the best outcome) for all stakeholders. And again, if you were a vested stakeholder, you would be open to this idea of an open market auction for equity. The only reason you do not care about defaulting to "worthlessness" and not realizing maximum value for assets and equity, is because it does not economically benefit or harm you to make that decision, and a recapitalization may - again - not be in the interest of your position retention. Your interests are not aligned with the stakeholders to whom you have a fiduciary duty to, plain and simple. I will add, that it would be starkly inappropriate, for any supposed open market auction of assets (or equity) to be held, until your oligarchic regime is defunct and democratic processes well resume their course.

Need I go on? Whether it crosses from immoral to illegal or not, you all should be ashamed of your acts, and I think you and I both know how you will fare when the Irish High Court is made aware of your "scheme". You could not have illustrated your intentions and self-serving interests more blatantly. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court went along with your "song and dance" of "hopeless insolvency" (for the record, agreeing with it), but of course you are insolvent when you engage in fraudulent accounting, marking assets to "worthless" value consideration (when you have no proof of such "worthlessness" and have held no open market auctions to prove out value, as required by Irish law, so you can self-deal those assets to an entity for which post-reorganization insiders will be allocated an equity interest in), while also extrapolating your "liabilities" into the trillions through mere non-factual, speculation, when those "liabilities" are not even automatically enforceable through a reciprocal judgment agreement (if you had actually had a judgment, which you do not) against the entities which you are bankrupting (as you, out the other side of your mouth, have numerous times stated that you vehemently denied any liability in the opioid or Acthar litigation at all). That sentence was long, was it not? But that is just how convoluted your "scheme" is. Your intentions could not be clearer. And again, you, the Company, try to claim I am misleading? Give me a break. Were you lying when you said you had no liability in the outstanding litigation, or are you lying now when you say liability in that litigation is in the "trillions" of dollars (when you decide you want to capriciously throw in the towel at the expense of your shareholders and bondholders, to secure a big, fat equity allocation for those who may be lucky enough to remain as post-reorganization insiders)? You cannot even keep a story straight, and now you want to blame me for believing the story that actually had some factual support behind it and is not a mere wad of convenient speculation. You may be able to attempt a reorganization out of convenience in the United States, but Ireland does not allow reorganization without proven (not speculated) insolvency, which you have far from done here, and in fact stated the opposite many times before.

So, while I am not telling you to stop what you are doing, if you continue, you are doing so while you are blatantly aware what you are doing is in direct violation of Irish law. You are illustrating to the rest of directors of public companies around the world of what not to do, and how not to uphold fiduciary duties.

Very Truly Yours,

Alexander Parker

Senior Managing Director

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.

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The Buxton Helmsley Group Inc: Exhibit 99.6 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

VIA REGISTERED U.S. POSTAL MAIL AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
board.directors@mnk.com; investor.relations@mnk.com;

March 10, 2021

Board of Directors – All Members
Mallinckrodt Plc.
675 McDonnell Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63042
United States of America

Re: Mallinckrodt Plc. Shareholder Action – Immediate Response Demanded and Required

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc. (“Buxton”) is a registered investment adviser. As you are now aware, Buxton and a group of like-minded investors have acquired a 5.6% interest in Mallinckrodt plc (the “Company”).

The Board of Directors have thus far ignored the Company's shareholders and acted in complete disregard of the owners of the Company and the duties it owes to them. We can no longer sit idle while this Board recklessly pursues the complete destruction of shareholder value. The Board's failures are almost too numerous to mention, but to name a few:

Pursuing reorganization plans that ignore the intrinsic value of the Company and rob the shareholders at any chance of realizing value;

Failing to explore a meaningful bidding process or strategic alternatives that would have preserved the value of the Company and its products;

Undervaluing drugs in the pipeline;

Self-dealing;

Failure to comply with ownership requirements for the Board and management;

Capriciously settling litigation for the convenience of the Board and its management without regard to the impact on the owners of the Company.

Despite the Company's present condition, we firmly believe that there is much to be gained from a successful and rapid transition in strategy and leadership.

We demand that the Board of Directors contact me at once to discuss our proposals for righting these wrongs. We expect the Board to be mindful of its duties and to take our proposals seriously.

Ultimately, shareholders like us have means to effect changes necessary to protect our investment. We are prepared to take any legally permissible action to hold this Board and management accountable for their many failures and betrayals.

I look forward to hearing from you as soon as possible, holding a telephonic conference (with all directors present) no later than 4:00 pm Eastern Standard Time on Friday, March 12, 2021.

Most Sincerely,

/s/ Alexander Parker

Alexander Parker

Senior Managing Director

The Buxton Helmsley Group, Inc.